In all human probability it is almost certain that the development of affairs will take a course similar to the last phase in the peace with Northern Russia, and will lead to an easy and complete success for the Central Powers.  That we lay down the frontier rectification as conditio sine qua non forms a justifiable measure to protect an important interest for the Monarchy of a purely defensive nature.  It is energetically demanded by the entire patriotic public opinion of Hungary.  It appears out of the question that a Minister of Foreign Affairs, had he taken up another attitude in the matter, would have been able to remain in the Delegation.

  And, besides, the procedure—­to which the greatest importance must
  be attached—­is absolutely necessary in order not to compromise
  the chances of a general peace.

It is obvious from the public statements of leading statesmen of the Western Powers that they will not be prevailed upon to agree to an acceptable peace, as they do not believe in our capacity and firm resolve to carry it out.  Whatever confirms their views in this respect widens the distance between us and peace; the only way to bring us really nearer to peace is to adopt an attitude that will lead them to think differently.

This must constitute the line of action in our resolves and undertakings.  In connection with the Roumanian peace, it is evident that to yield on the frontier question—­even for fear of a breakdown in the negotiations—­must have a deplorable effect on the opinion our enemies have of us.  It would certainly be right not to take advantage of Roumania’s desperate situation, but to grant her reasonable peace terms in accordance with the principles embodied in our statements.  But if we do not act with adequate firmness on that reasonable basis we shall encourage the Western Powers in the belief that it is not necessary to conclude a peace with us on the basis of the integrity of our territory and sovereignty, and fierce and bitter fighting may be looked for to teach them otherwise.

  TISZA.

  February 27, 1916.

Andrassy and Wekerle were also opposed to a milder treatment of Roumania, and thus the whole Hungarian Parliament were of one accord on the question.  I am not sure what standpoint Karolyi held, and I do not know if at that period the “tiger soul” which he at one time displayed to Roumania, or the pacifist soul which he laid later at the feet of General Franchet d’Esperey, dominated.

Thus at Brest-Litovsk, when the Roumanian peace appeared on the horizon, I took up the standpoint that the party desirous of peace negotiations must be supported.