At Brest-Litovsk rumours had already spread that Roumania did not intend to continue the war.  These rumours assumed a very definite character after peace was concluded with the Ukraine.  That peace, as well as Trotski’s attitude, left no doubt in Bucharest that Roumania could no longer reckon on further co-operation on the part of Russia and gave rise to the idea in some circles that she would turn back.  I say in some circles, for there was one group which, to the very last moment, was all for war.

While at Brest-Litovsk I began to get into touch with the leaders of the Hungarian Parliament in order to come to an agreement on the peace aims relating to Roumania.  It was evident that, as regards Roumania, a peace without annexations would be more difficult to bring about than with any other state, because the treacherous attack by the Roumanians on the whole of Hungary had raised the desire for a better strategical frontier.  As might be expected, I met with violent opposition from Hungary, where, under the name of strategical frontier rectifications, as a matter of fact greater annexations were desired.  The first person with whom I dealt was Stephen Tisza, who, at great trouble, was brought to modify his original standpoint and finally was led so far as to admit that the fundamental ideas for peace were capable of acceptance.  On February 27, 1918, he handed me a pro-memoria with the request to show it to the Emperor, in which he explained his already more conciliatory point of view, though, nevertheless, he very distinctly showed his disapproval of my intentions.  The pro-memoria reads as follows: 

  Unfortunately, Roumania can withdraw from the war not as much
  exhausted as justice and the justified interests of the Monarchy
  could wish.

The loss of the Dobrudsha will be made good by territorial gains in Bessarabia, while the frontier rectifications demanded by us are out of all proportion with Roumania’s guilt and with her military situation.

Our peace terms are so mild that they are as a generous gift offered to vanquished Roumania and are not at all to be made a subject for negotiations.  In no case are these negotiations to assume the character of trading or bargaining.  If Roumania refuses to conclude peace on the basis laid down by us our answer can only be a resumption of hostilities.

I consider it highly probable that the Roumanian Government will run that risk to prove her necessity in the eyes of the Western Powers and her own population.  But it is just as probable that after breaking off negotiations she will just as quickly turn back and give way before our superior forces.

  At the worst a short campaign would result in the total collapse
  of Roumania.