“February 4, 1918.—­Arrived Berlin.  Nothing this afternoon, as the Germans are holding council among themselves.

“February 5, 1918.—­Sitting all day.  I had several violent passages of arms with Ludendorff.  Matters seemed to be clearing up, though this is not yet altogether done.  Apart from deciding on our tactics for Brest, we have at last to set down in writing that we are only obliged to fight for the pre-war possessions of Germany.  Ludendorff was violently opposed to this, and said, ’If Germany makes peace without profit, then Germany has lost the war.’

“The controversy was growing more and more heated, when Hertling nudged me and whispered:  ’Leave him alone, we two will manage it together without him.’

“I am now going to work out the draft at once and send it in to Hertling.

“Supper this evening at Hoehenlohe.

“February 6, 1918.—­Arrived Brest this evening.  Wiesner has been at it untiringly and done excellent work; the situation, too, is easier now.  The leader of the Austrian Ruthenians, Nikolay Wassilko, arrived yesterday, and albeit evidently excited by the part his Russian-Ukrainian comrades are playing at Brest, speaks nationally, far more chauvinistically than when I thought I knew him in Vienna, and we have at last agreed on the minimum of the Ukrainian demands.  I gave as my advice in Berlin that we should try to finish with the Ukrainians as soon as possible.  I could then in the name of Germany commence negotiations with Trotski, and try if I could not get speech with him privately, and find out whether any agreement were possible or not.  It is Gratz’s idea.  After some opposition we agreed.

“February 7, 1918.—­My conversation with Trotski took place.  I took Gratz with me; he has far exceeded all my expectations of him.  I began by telling Trotski that a breach of the regulations and a resumption of hostilities were imminent, and wished to know if this could not be avoided before the fatal step were definitely taken.  I therefore begged Herr Trotski to inform me openly and without reserve what conditions he would accept.  Trotski then declared very frankly and clearly that he was not so simple as we appeared to think, that he knew well enough force was the strongest of all arguments, and that the Central Powers were quite capable of taking away the Russian provinces.  He had several times tried to bridge a way for Kuehlmann during the conference, telling him it was not a question of the right of self-determination of the peoples in the occupied districts, but of sheer brutal annexation, and that he must give way to force.  He would never relinquish his principles, and would never give his consent to this interpretation of the right of self-determination.  The Germans must say straight out what were the boundaries they demanded, and he would then make clear to all Europe that it was a brutal annexation and nothing else, but that Russia was too