“January 8, 1918.—­The Turkish Grand Vizier, Talaat Pasha, arrived during the night, and has just been to call on me.  He seems emphatically in favour of making peace; but I fancy he would like, in case of any conflict arising with Germany, to push me into the foreground and keep out of the way himself.  Talaat Pasha is one of the cleverest heads among the Turks, and perhaps the most energetic man of them all.

“Before the Revolution he was a minor official in the telegraph service, and was on the revolutionary committee.  In his official capacity, he got hold of a telegram from the Government which showed him that the revolutionary movement would be discovered and the game be lost unless immediate action were taken.  He suppressed the message, warned the revolutionary committee, and persuaded them to start their work at once.  The coup succeeded, the Sultan was deposed, and Talaat was made Minister of the Interior.  With iron energy he then turned his attention to the suppression of the opposing movement.  Later, he became Grand Vizier, and impersonated, together with Enver Pasha, the will and power of Turkey.

“This afternoon, first a meeting of the five heads of the allied delegations and the Russian.  Afterwards, plenary sitting.

“The sitting postponed again, as the Ukrainians are still not ready with their preparations.  Late in the evening I had a conversation with Kuehlmann and Hoffmann, in which we agreed fairly well as to tactics.  I said again that I was ready to stand by them and hold to their demands as far as ever possible, but in the event of Germany’s breaking off the negotiations with Russia I must reserve the right to act with a free hand.  Both appeared to understand my point of view, especially Kuehlmann, who, if he alone should decide, would certainly not allow the negotiations to prove fruitless.  As to details, we agreed to demand continuation of the negotiations at Brest-Litovsk in the form of an ultimatum.

“January 9, 1918.—­Acting on the principle that attack is the best defence, we had determined not to let the Russian Foreign Minister speak at all, but to go at him at once with our ultimatum.

“Trotski had prepared a long speech, and the effect of our attack was such that he at once appealed for adjournment, urging that the altered state of affairs called for new resolutions.  The removal of the conference to Stockholm would have meant the end of matters for us, for it would have been utterly impossible to keep the Bolsheviks of all countries from putting in an appearance there, and the very thing we had endeavoured with the utmost of our power to avoid from the start—­to have the reins torn from our hands and these elements take the lead—­would infallibly have taken place.  We must now wait to see what to-morrow brings:  either a victory or the final termination of the negotiations.

“Adler said to me in Vienna:  ’You will certainly get on all right with Trotski,’ and when I asked him why he thought so, he answered:  ’Well, you and I get on quite well together, you know.’