Having made these statements, I wish to explain why a separate peace was a sheer impossibility for us.  In other words, what were the reasons that prevented us from ending the war and becoming neutral—­reasons which only left one possibility open to us:  to change our adversary, and instead of fighting the Entente, together with Germany, to join the Entente and with her fight against Germany?  It must, above all, be kept in mind that up to the last days that I held office the Eastern front was manned by Austro-Hungarian and German troops all mixed together, and this entire army was under the Imperial German Command.  We had no army of our own in the East—­not in the true sense of the word, as it had been merged into the German army.  That was a consequence of our military inferiority.  Again and again we resorted to German aid.  We called repeatedly for help in Serbia, Roumania, Russia, and Italy, and were compelled to purchase it by giving up certain things.  Our notorious inferiority was only in very slight degree the fault of the individual soldier; rather did it emanate from the general state of Austro-Hungarian affairs.  We entered the war badly equipped and sadly lacking in artillery; the various Ministers of War and the Parliaments were to blame in that respect.  The Hungarian Parliament neglected the army for years because their national claims were not attended to, and in Austria the Social Democrats had always been opposed to any measures of defence, scenting therein plans for attack and not defence.

Our General Staff was in part very bad.  There were, of course, exceptions, but they only prove the rule.  What was chiefly wanting was contact with the troops.  These gentlemen sat with their backs turned and gave their orders.  Hardly ever did they see the men at the front or where the bullets whistled.  During the war the troops learned to hate the General Staff.  It was very different in the German army.  The German General Staffs exacted much, but they also achieved much; above all, they exposed themselves freely and set an example.  Ludendorff, sword in hand, took Liege, accompanied by a couple of men!  In Austria archdukes were put into leading posts for which they were quite unsuited.  Some of them were utterly incompetent; the Archdukes Friedrich, Eugen, and Joseph formed three exceptions.  The first of these in particular very rightly looked upon his post not as that of a leader of operations, but as a connecting link between us and Germany, and between the army and the Emperor Francis Joseph.  He always acted correctly and with eminent tact, and overcame many difficulties.  What was left of our independence was lost after Luck.