despite the possibly ephemeral character of his position and the certainty of revolution.  The briefer Lenin’s period of power the more need to act speedily, for no subsequent Russian Government will recommence the war—­and I cannot take a Russian Metternich as my partner when there is none to be had.

The Germans are hesitating—­they do not altogether like the idea of having any dealings with Lenin, possibly also from the reasons already mentioned; they are inconsistent in this, as is often the case.  The German military party—­which, as everyone knows, holds the reins of policy in Germany entirely—­have, as far as I can see, done all they could to overthrow Kerenski and set up “something else” in his place.  Now, the something else is there, and is ready to make peace; obviously, then, one must act, even though the party concerned is not such as one would have chosen for oneself.

It is impossible to get any exact information about these Bolsheviks; that is to say, there is plenty of information available, but it is contradictory.  The way they begin is this:  everything in the least reminiscent of work, wealth, and culture must be destroyed, and the bourgeoisie exterminated.  Freedom and equality seem no longer to have any place on their programme; only a bestial suppression of all but the proletariat itself.  The Russian bourgeois class, too, seems almost as stupid and cowardly as our own, and its members let themselves be slaughtered like sheep.

True, this Russian Bolshevism is a peril to Europe, and if we had the power, besides securing a tolerable peace for ourselves, to force other countries into a state of law and order, then it would be better to have nothing to do with such people as these, but to march on Petersburg and arrange matters there.  But we have not the power; peace at the earliest possible moment is necessary for our own salvation, and we cannot obtain peace unless the Germans get to Paris—­and they cannot get to Paris unless their Eastern front is freed.  That is the circle complete.  All this the German military leaders themselves maintain, and it is altogether illogical of them now apparently to object to Lenin on personal grounds.

I was unable to finish this letter yesterday, and now add this to-day.  Yesterday another attempt was made, from a quarter which you will guess, to point out to me the advantage of a separate peace.  I spoke to the Emperor about it, and told him that this would simply be shooting oneself for fear of death; that I could not take such a step myself, but would be willing to resign under some pretext or other, when he would certainly find men ready to make the attempt.  The conference of London has determined on a division of the Monarchy, and no separate peace on our part would avail to alter that.  The Roumanians, Serbians and Italians are to receive enormous compensation, we are to lose Trieste, and the remainder is to be broken