the strongest of all the Russian parties, having succeeded in leading the whole of the peasant movement into its course—­at the Pan-Russian Congress the great majority of the peasants’ deputies were Social Revolutionaries, and no Social Democrat was elected to the executive committee of the Peasants’ Deputies’ Council.  A section of this party, and, it would seem, the greater and more influential portion, is definitely opposed to any offensive.  This is plainly stated in the leading organs of the party, Delo Naroda and Zemlja i Wolja.  Only a small and apparently uninfluential portion, grouped round the organ Volja Naroda, faces the bourgeois Press with unconditional demands for an offensive to relieve the Allies, as does the Plechanow group.  Kerenski’s party, the Trudoviks, as also the related People’s Socialists, represented in the Cabinet by the Minister of Food, Peschechonow, are still undecided whether to follow Kerenski here or not.  Verbal information, and utterances in the Russian Press, as, for instance, the Retch, assert that Kerenski’s health gives grounds for fearing a fatal catastrophe in a short time.  The official organ of the Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies’ Council, the Isvestia, on the other hand, frequently asserts with great emphasis that an offensive must unquestionably be made.  It is characteristic that a speech made by the Minister of Agriculture, Tschernow, to the Peasants’ Congress, was interpreted as meaning that he was opposed to the offensive, so that he was obliged to justify himself to his colleagues in the Ministry and deny that such had been his meaning.

While, then, people at home are seriously divided on the question of an offensive, the men at the front appear but little inclined to undertake any offensive.  This is stated by all parties in the Russian Press, the symptoms being regarded either with satisfaction or with regret.  The infantry in particular are against the offensive; the only enthusiasm is to be found among the officers, in the cavalry or a part of it, and the artillery.  It is characteristic also that the Cossacks are in favour of war.  These, at any rate, have an ulterior motive, in that they hope by success at the front to be able ultimately to overthrow the revolutionary regime.  For there is this to be borne in mind:  that while most of the Russian peasants have no landed property exceeding five deshatin, and three millions have no land at all, every Cossack owns forty deshatin, an unfair distinction which is constantly being referred to in all discussion of the land question.  This is a sufficient ground for the isolated position of the Cossacks in the Revolution, and it was for this reason also that they were formerly always among the most loyal supporters of the Tsar.

  Extremely characteristic of the feeling at the front are the
  following details: