The actual reason of Tisza’s dismissal was not the question of electoral reforms, as his successors could only act according to Tisza’s instructions.  For, as leader of the majority, which he continued to be even after his dismissal, no electoral reforms could be carried out in opposition to his will.  Tisza thought that the Emperor meditated putting in a coalition majority against him, which he considered quite logical, though not agreeable.

The next difficulty was the attitude of the Germans towards Poland.  At the occupation of Poland we were already unfairly treated, and the Germans had appropriated the greater part of the country.  Always and everywhere, they were the stronger on the battlefield, and the consequence was that they claimed the lion’s share of all the successes gained.  This was in reality quite natural, but it greatly added to all diplomatic and political activities, which were invariably prejudiced and hindered by military facts.  When I entered upon office, Germany’s standpoint was that she had a far superior right to Poland, and that the simplest solution would be for us to evacuate the territory we had occupied.  It was, of course, obvious that I could not accept such a proposal, and we held firmly to the point that under no circumstances would our troops leave Lublin.  After much controversy, the Germans agreed, tant bien que mal, to this solution.  The further development of the affair showed that the German standpoint went through many changes.  In general, it fluctuated between two extremes:  either Poland must unite herself to Germany—­the German-Polish solution, or else vast portions of her territory must be ceded to Germany to be called frontier adjustments, and what remained would be either for us or for Poland herself.  Neither solution could be accepted by us.  The first one for this reason, that the Polish question being in the foreground made that of Galicia very acute, as it would have been quite impossible to retain Galicia in the Monarchy when separated from the rest of Poland.  We were obliged to oppose the German-Polish solution, not from any desire for conquest, but to prevent the sacrifice of Galicia for no purpose.

The second German suggestion was just as impossible to carry out, because Poland, crippled beyond recognition by the frontier readjustment, even though united with Galicia, would have been so unsatisfactory a factor that there would never have been any prospect of harmonious dealings with her.

The third difficulty was presented by the Poles themselves, as they naturally wished to secure the greatest possible profit out of their release by the Central Powers, even though it did not contribute much to their future happiness so far as military support was concerned.  There were many different parties among them:  first of all, one for the Entente; a second, Bilinski’s party; above all, one for the Central Powers, especially when we gained military successes.