Count Czernin appears to have a clear understanding of the peace foundations and does not obscure their sense.  He sees that an independent Poland composed of all the undeniably Polish inhabitants, the one bordering on the other, is a matter for European settlement and must be granted; further, that Belgium must be evacuated and restored, no matter what sacrifices and concessions it may involve; also that national desires must be satisfied, even in his own Empire, in the common interests of Europe and humanity.

Though he is silent on certain matters more closely connected with the interests of his Allies than with Austria-Hungary, that is only natural, because he feels compelled under the circumstances to defer to Germany and Turkey.  Recognising and agreeing with the important principles in question and the necessity of converting them into action, he naturally feels that Austria-Hungary, more easily than Germany, can concur with the war aims as expressed by the United States.  He would probably have gone even further had he not been constrained to consider the Austro-Hungarian Alliance and the country’s dependence on Germany.

In the same speech the President goes on to say: 

Count Czernin’s answer referring mainly to my speech of January 8 is couched in very friendly terms.  He sees in my statements a sufficiently encouraging approach to the views of his own Government to justify his belief that they afford a basis for a thorough discussion by both Governments of the aims.

And again: 

I must say Count Hertling’s answer is very undecided and most confusing, full of equivocal sentences, and it is difficult to say what it aims at.  It certainly is written in a very different tone from that of Count Czernin’s speech and obviously with a very different object in view.

There can be no doubt that when the head of a State at war with us speaks in such friendly terms of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, he has the best intentions of coming to an understanding.  My efforts in this connection were interrupted by my dismissal.

In these last weeks during which I remained in office the Emperor had definitely lost faith in me.  This was not due to the Wilson question, nor yet was it the direct consequence of my general policy.  A difference of opinion between certain persons in the Emperor’s entourage and myself was the real reason.  The situation became so strained as to make it unbearable.  The forces that conspired against me convinced me that it would be impossible for me to gain my objective which, being of a very difficult nature, could not be obtained unless the Emperor gave me his full confidence.

In spite of all the rumours and stories spread about me I do not intend to go into details unless I should be compelled to do so by accounts derived from reliable sources.  I am still convinced to this day that morally I was perfectly right.  I was wrong as to form, because I was neither clever nor patient enough to bend the opposition, but would have broken it, by reducing the situation to a case of “either—­or”.