The advantage of the Wilson programme in the eyes of the whole world was its violent contrast to the terms of the Pact of London.  The right of self-determination for the nations had been utterly ignored in London by the allotment of German Tyrol to Italy.  Wilson forbade this and declared that nations could not be treated against their will and moved hither and thither like the pieces in a game of chess.  Wilson said that every solution of a territorial question arising out of this war must be arrived at in the interests and in favour of the peoples concerned, and not as a mere balancing or compromise of claims from rival sources; and further, that all clearly stated national claims would receive the utmost satisfaction that could be afforded them, without admitting new factors or the perpetuation of old disputes or oppositions, which in all probability would soon again disturb the peace of Europe and the whole world.  A general peace, established on such a basis could be discussed—­and more in the same strain.

The publication of this clear and absolutely acceptable programme seemed from day to day to render possible a peaceful solution of the world conflict.  In the eyes of millions of people this programme opened up a world of hope.  A new star had risen on the other side of the ocean, and all eyes were turned in that direction.  A mighty man had come forward and with one powerful act had upset the London resolutions and, in so doing, had reopened the gates for a peace of understanding.

From the first moment the main question was, so it seemed, what hopes were there of Wilson’s programme being carried out in London, Paris and, above all, in Rome?

Secret information sent to me from the Entente countries seemed to suggest that the Fourteen Points were decidedly not drawn up in agreement with England, France and Italy.  On the other hand I was, and still am, fully persuaded that Wilson had spoken honestly and sincerely and, as a matter of fact, believed that his programme could be carried out.

Wilson’s great miscalculation was his mistaken estimate of the actual distribution of power in the Entente on the one hand, and his surprising ignorance of national relationships in Europe, and especially in Austria-Hungary, on the other hand, which would greatly weaken his position and his influence on his Allies.  There would be no difficulty in the Entente’s cleverly introducing Wilson into the international labyrinth and there bewildering him with wrong directions, so that he could not find his way out again.  To begin with, therefore, Wilson’s theory brought us not a step further.

The ’67 settlement was proposed by a leading German-Magyar magnate in Austria-Hungary.  Fifty years ago nationalism was much less developed than it is now.  Nations were still sleeping—­the Czechs, Slovaks and Southern Slavs, the Roumanians and Ruthenians had barely awakened to national life.  Fifty years ago it was possible to distinguish between what was deceptive and what gave promise of lasting.  The union between Italians and Germans only took effect with the coming of—­or was perhaps the first sign of—­the world-movement.  At all events it was in the second half of the last century that we came within the radius of international politics.