by unofficial cross-purposes become caught in the toils of separatist desires, but had quickly and consistently carried out our task, is not proved, and never will be.  After the debacle in the winter of 1918-19 it was intimated to me as a fact that when Clemenceau came into power a peace of understanding with Germany became out of the question.  His standpoint was that Germany must be definitely vanquished and crushed.  Our negotiations, however, had begun under Briand, and Clemenceau only came into power when the peace negotiations had become entangled and were beginning to falter.

With regard to Austria-Hungary, both France and England would have welcomed a separate peace on our part, even during Clemenceau’s period of office; but in that case we should have had to accept the terms of the London conference.

Such was the peace question then.  How it would have developed if no misleading policy had come into being naturally cannot be stated.

I am not putting forward suppositions but confirming facts.  And the fact remains that the failure of the U-boat campaign on the one hand, and a policy carried on behind the backs of the responsible men on the other hand, were the reasons why the favourable moment passed and the peace efforts were checked.  And I herewith repeat that this fact does not in itself prove that peace negotiations would not also have failed later if the two reasons mentioned above had not existed.

It became quite clear in the autumn that the war would have to continue.  In my speeches to delegations I endeavoured to leave no doubt that we were faithful to our Allies.  When I said “I see no difference between Strassburg and Trieste,” I said it chiefly for Sofia and Constantinople, for the overthrow of the Quadruple Alliance was the greatest danger.  I still hoped to be able to prop the trembling foundations of the Alliance policy, and either to secure a general peace in the East, where the military opposition was giving way, or to see it draw nearer through the anticipated German break-through on the Western front.

Several months after my dismissal in the summer of 1918 I spoke in the Herrenhaus on foreign policy, and warned everyone present against trying to undermine the Quadruple Alliance.  When I declared that “honour, duty to the Alliance, and the call for self-preservation compel us to fight by the side of Germany,” I was misunderstood.  It did not seem as though the public realised that the moment the Entente thought the Quadruple Alliance was about to break up, from that moment our cause was lost.  Had the public no knowledge of the London agreement?  Did they not know that a separate peace would hand us over totally defenceless to those cruel conditions?  Did they not realise that the German army was the shield that afforded us the last and only possibility of escaping the fate of being broken up?

My successor steered the same course as I had done, doubtless from the same reasons of honour and the call for self-preservation.  I have no particulars as to what occurred in the summer of 1918.