of that nature must be excluded from all future contingencies.  Before we conclude peace we must have the positive assurance that our present enemies have given up that idea.

Those, my honourable friends, are the principles of the new world organisation as it presents itself to me, and they are all based on general disarmament.  Germany, in her answer to the Papal Note, has also positively recognised the idea of a general disarmament.  Our present enemies have likewise, partly at any rate, adopted these principles.  I differ from Lloyd George in most points, but agree thoroughly on one—­that there nevermore should be a war of revenge.

The impression made by my speech on the Entente surpassed the most pessimistic expectations.  In order not to approach too closely the subject of their own disarmament, my propositions were said to be hypocritical and a peace trap.  This needs no comment.

Had the Entente replied that I must obtain the support of and secure a guarantee from Germany that she would disarm, it would have been an opportunity for me, with the help of the nations, to exercise the greatest possible pressure on Germany’s leaders.  But the sword was knocked out of my hand by the Entente themselves, for the retort came from Berlin:  Here is the proof that the Entente rejects our offer of disarmament as they reject everything coming from us.  There is only one way out of it—­a fight to the end and then victory.

Again did the Entente force the peoples of the Central Powers to side unconditionally with the generals.

Never in the whole term of my office did I receive so many letters as after my speech—­both for and against, with both sides equally impetuous.  “Death sentences” from Germany were showered on me; scorn and contempt alternated with genuine sympathy and agreement.

In the autumn of 1917 the peace movement diminished visibly.  The U-boat fiasco was very obvious.  England saw that she was able to overcome the danger.  The German military leaders still spoke of the positively expected successes of their submarines, but the tenor of their predictions became very different.  There was no longer any talk of the downfall of England within a few months.  A new winter campaign was almost a certainty, and yet the Germans insisted that though mistakes occurred in the term fixed, this was not so respecting the ultimate effect of the U-boats and that England would collapse.  The U-boat warfare had achieved this amount of success, that the Western front remained intact, though it would otherwise have fallen.

The military situation underwent a change in the autumn.  The end of the war in the East was within sight, and the possibility of being able to fling the enormous masses of troops from the East into the line in the West, and at last break through there, greatly improved the situation.

It was not on the sea that the U-boat campaign had brought about a decision, but it enabled a final decision on land to be made; such was the new military opinion.  Paris and Calais could not be taken.