of Trieste and the Trentino, as well as the German South Tyrol, to Italy, and concessions to the Southern Slav state would be unavoidable, besides reforms in the Monarchy on a federal basis.  Our answer was that a one-sided concession of Austro-Hungarian and German territory in that form was, naturally, not possible.  But still we thought that, under certain premises in the territorial questions, an agreement might perhaps not meet with insurmountable difficulties.  As a matter of course, however, the Entente were not in a position to make terms such as could only be laid down by the victor to the vanquished, as we were anything but beaten, but, in spite of that, we did not cling so firmly to the frontier posts in the Monarchy.

It might be thought, therefore, that, the Entente being willing, a settlement of the various interests would be possible; but proposals such as the giving up of Trieste, Bozen, and Meran were impossible, as was also the suggestion to make peace behind Germany’s back.  I referred to the military situation and the impossibility of anyone accepting these views of the Entente.  I was full of confidence in the future, and even if that were not the case I could not conclude a peace in the present situation which the Entente could not dictate in other terms, even if we were beaten.  To lose Trieste and access to the Adriatic was a totally unacceptable condition, just as much as the unconditional surrender of Alsace-Lorraine.

Neutral statesmen agreed with my views that the Entente demands were not couched in the terms of a peace of understanding, but of victory.  Opinion in neutral countries was quite clear on the subject.  But in England especially there were various currents of thought; not everyone shared Lloyd George’s views.  The main point was, however, to lead up to a debate which would tend to clear up many matters, and I seized the idea eagerly.  The greatest difficulty, I was assured by some, lay in the Entente’s assertion that Germany had shown remarkable military strength, but yet had not been adequately prepared for war; she had not had sufficient stores either of raw materials or provisions, and had not built sufficient U-boats.  The Entente’s idea was that if peace were made now, Germany might perhaps accept even unfavourable conditions, but it would only be to gain time and make use of the peace to draw breath before beginning a fresh war.  She would make up for loss of time and “hit out again.”  The Entente, therefore, considered the preliminary condition of any peace, or even of a discussion of terms, to be the certainty of the abolition of German militarism.  I replied that nobody wished for more war, and that I agreed with the Entente that a guarantee in that connection must be secured, but that a one-sided disarmament and disbanding of men by Austria-Hungary and Germany was an impossibility.  It might be imagined what it would be like if one fine day an army, far advanced in the enemy country, full of confidence