By the term “Prussian militarism” England did not only mean the strength of the German army.  She understood it to be a combination of a warlike spirit bent on oppressing others, and supported by the best and strongest army in the world.  The first would have been innocuous without the second; and the splendid German army was in England’s eyes the instrument of a domineering and conquest-loving autocrat.  According to England’s view, Germany was exactly the counterpart of France under Bonaparte—­if for Napoleon be substituted a many-headed being called “Emperor, Crown Prince, Hindenburg, Ludendorff”—­and just as little as England would treat with Napoleon would she have any dealings with the individual who to her was the personification of the lust for conquest and the policy of violence.

The notion of the existence of German militarism seems to be quite justified, although the Emperor and the Crown Prince played the smallest part in it.  But it seems to me an altogether wrong conception that militarism is a speciality of Germany.  The negotiations at Versailles must now have convinced the general public that it is not only on the banks of the Spree that militarism reigns.

Germany in former days was never able to understand that on the enemy continent, by the side of morally unjustified envy, fear and anxiety as to Germany’s plans practically reigned, and that the talk about the “hard” and “German” peace, about “victory and triumph” was like throwing oil on the flames of their fears; that in England and France, too, at one time, there was a current of feeling urging for a peace of settlement, and that such expressions as the foregoing were highly detrimental to all pacifist tendencies.

In my opinion the air raids on England may be ranked in the same category as these expressions.  They were carried out with the greatest heroism by the German fliers, but no other object was gained but to irritate and anger England and rouse to the utmost resistance all who otherwise had pacifist tendencies.  I said this to Ludendorff when he called on me at the Ballplatz in the summer of 1917, but it made not the slightest impression on him.

The demarche for peace made by the Pope and our reply have been published in the European Press.  We accepted the noble proposals made by the Holy Father.  I have therefore nothing to add on that matter.

In the early part of the summer of 1917 the Socialist Conference at Stockholm had become a practical question.  I issued passports to the representatives of our Social Democrats, and had several difficulties to overcome in connection therewith.  My own standpoint is made clear by the following letter to Tisza.

  (Not dated.)