Later I had information from England relating to the official view of the situation there, which differed very much from the optimistic confidential reports, and proved that the desire for peace was not so strong.  It will easily be understood that for us the English policy was always the most interesting.  England’s entry into the war had made the situation so dangerous that an understanding arrived at with her—­that is, an understanding between England and Germany through our intervention—­would have put an end to the war.

This information was to the effect that England was less than ever inclined to confer with Germany until the two cardinal points had been guaranteed—­the cession of Alsace-Lorraine and the abolition of German militarism.  The former was a French claim, and England must and would support France in this to her very utmost; the second claim was necessary in the interests of the future peace of the world.  Germany’s military strength was always estimated very highly in England, but the army’s deeds in this war had surpassed all expectations.  The military successes had encouraged the growth of the military spirit.  The peace resolution passed in the Reichstag proved nothing, or at any rate, not enough, for the Reichstag is not the real exponent of the Empire in the outside world; it became paralysed through an unofficial collateral Government, the generals, who possessed the greater power.  Certain statements made by General Ludendorff—­so the Entente said—­proved that Germany did not wish for an honourable peace of understanding.  Besides this the Wilhelmstrasse did not associate itself with the majority in the Reichstag.  The war was not being waged against the German nation, but against its militarism, and to conclude peace with the latter would be impossible.  It appeared, further, that in no circumstances would England restore Germany’s colonies.  So far as the Monarchy was concerned, England appeared to be ready to conclude a separate peace with her, though subject to the promises made to her own Allies.  According to the latter there was much territory to be given up to Italy, Serbia and Roumania.  But in exchange we might reckon on a sort of annexation of newly made states like Poland.

This information left no doubt that England was not then thinking of making advances to Germany; the fear of Prussian militarism was at the bottom of her reasons for refusing.  My impression was that, through a more favourable continuous development, a settlement and understanding might be feasible on the territorial but not on the military questions.  On the contrary, the stronger Germany’s military power proved itself to be, the more did the Entente fear that their enemy’s power of defence would be invincible unless it was broken then.

Not only the period preceding war and the outbreak of war, but the actual course of the war has been full of many and disturbing misunderstandings.  For long it was not understood here what England meant by the term militarism.  It was pointed out that the English Navy was jealously defending the dominion of the seas, that France and Russia stood ready armed for the attack, and that Germany was only in a similar position to any other state; that every state strengthened and equipped its defensive forces as thoroughly as possible.