Astronomical causes sometimes give rise to disturbances in the universe, the reason of which cannot be understood by the observer.  I felt in the same way, without being able to prove anything definite, from certain signs that I noticed, that in those worlds on the other side of the trenches events were happening that were inexplicable to me.  I felt the effect, but could not discover the cause.  In the spirit of the Entente, now more favourably disposed for peace, an undertone was distinctly audible.  There was anxiety and a greater inclination for peace than formerly, but again probably only in view of the alleged laxity of our Alliance conditions and the hopes of the downfall of the Quadruple Alliance.  A friend of mine, a subject of a neutral state, wrote to me from Paris in the summer and told me he had heard from a reliable source that apparently at the Quai d’Orsay they expected the Monarchy to separate from Germany, which, as a matter of course, would alter the entire military situation.

Soon afterwards very secret information was received from a neutral country that a Bulgarian group was negotiating with the Entente behind the back and without the knowledge of Radoslawoff.  As soon as suspicion of a breach in the Alliance had been aroused in our Allies, the Bulgarian party hastened to forestall the event.  We felt as safe about Radoslawoff as about Talaat Pasha; but in both countries other forces were at work.

The suspicions aroused in our friends concerning our plans were a further disadvantage, certainly only of a technical nature, but yet not to be underestimated.  Our various agents worked splendidly, but it lay in the nature of the case that their dealings were more protracted than those carried out by the Foreign Minister himself.  According to the course taken by the conversations, they were obliged to seek fresh instructions; they were more tied, and therefore forced to assume a more halting attitude than a responsible leader would have to do.  In the summer of 1917, therefore, I suggested going to Switzerland myself, where negotiations were proceeding.  But my journey could not have been kept secret, and if an effort had been made to do so it would have been all the more certain to arouse suspicion, owing to the mistrust already awakened.  But not in Berlin.  I believe I still held the confidence of the leading men in Berlin sufficiently to avert that.  I should have explained the situation to the Imperial Chancellor, and that would have sufficed.  In Turkey and Bulgaria the case was different.

One party in Bulgaria favoured the Entente.  If Bulgaria was under the impression that our group was falling asunder she would have staked everything to try and save herself by a separate peace.  In Constantinople, too, there was an Entente group.  Talaat and Enver were as reliable as they were strong.  But a journey undertaken by me to Switzerland in the conditions described might prove to be the alarm signal for a general sauve qui peut.  But the very suggestion that the two Balkan countries would act as they supposed we should do would have sufficed to destroy any attempt at peace in Paris and London.