on which to start negotiations.  My standpoint in this matter is as follows:  I have already stated in the Reichstag that Germany is not striving for any great changes in power after the war, and is ready to negotiate provided the enemy does not demand the cession of any German territory; with such a conception of the term “reinstatement of the status quo,” that form would be a very suitable basis for negotiations.  This would not exclude the desired possibility of retaining the present frontiers, and by negotiating bring former enemy economic territory into close economic and military conjunction with Germany—­this would refer to Courland, Lithuania and Poland—­and thus secure Germany’s frontiers and give a guarantee for her vital needs on the continent and overseas.

Germany is ready to evacuate the occupied French territory, but must reserve to herself the right, by means of the peace negotiations, to the economic exploitation of the territory of Longwy and Briey, if not through direct incorporation, by a legal grant to exploit.  We are not in a position to cede to France any noteworthy districts in Alsace-Lorraine.

I should wish to have a free hand in the negotiations in the matter of connecting Belgium with Germany in a military and economic sense.  The terms that I read out, taken from notes at the Kreuznach negotiations—­the military control of Belgium until the conclusion of a defensive and offensive Alliance with Germany, the acquisition of Liege (or a long-term rental thereof)—­were the maximum claims of the Supreme Military and Naval Command.  The Supreme Military Command agrees with me that these terms or similar ones can only be secured if peace can be enforced on England.  But we are of opinion that a vast amount of economic and military influence must be brought to bear in Belgium in the matter of the negotiations and would perhaps not meet with much resistance, because Belgium, from economic distress, will come to see that her being joined to Germany is the best guarantee for a prosperous future.

As regards Poland, I note that the confidential hint from Your Excellency to give up Galicia and enrol it in the new Polish State is subject to the ceding of portions of Alsace-Lorraine to France, which was to be as a counter-sacrifice, but must be considered as out of the question.  The development of Poland as an independent State must be carried out in the sense of the proclamation of November 5, 1916.  Whether this development will prove to be an actual advantage for Germany or will become a great danger for the future will be tested later.  There are already many signs of danger, and what is particularly to be feared is that the Austro-Hungarian Government cannot notify us now during the war of her complete indifference to Poland and leave us a free hand in the administration of the whole state.

It will also remain to be seen whether,