Germany must publicly notify her position just as clearly as Austria-Hungary had done and must declare the following: 

  (1) No annexations, no indemnities.

  (2) Particularly the unconditional and total release of Belgium
        (politically and economically).

  (3) All territories occupied by Germany and Austria-Hungary to be
        evacuated as soon as both those States had had their
        territories restored to them (including the German
        colonies).

  (4) Germany, as well as Austria-Hungary, to work for a general
        disarmament and guarantee that no further war be possible.

Such declaration to be a joint one from the German Government and the Reichstag, and to be made public.

The peace resolution of July 19, 1917, was the result of this step.  The Imperial Chancellor Bethmann was the first victim.  The Supreme Military Command, by whom he always had been persecuted, now trying to secure his dismissal, declared such resolution to be unacceptable.  When Bethmann had gone and Michaelis had been appointed, they were satisfied.

Although the resolution in itself was satisfactory, it had one fault at the start.  It was no secret that everyone connected with Pan-Germanism, especially the German generals, disagreed with the decision, and would not accept the resolution as coming from the entire country.  Certainly the great majority in Germany, counting them per head, supported the resolution but the leading men, together with a considerable following, were opposed to it.  The “Starvation Peace,” the “Peace of Renunciation,” and the “Scheidemann Peace” were the subjects of articles in the papers expressing the greatest disapproval of the resolution.  Neither did the German Government take up any decided attitude.  On July 19 the Imperial Chancellor Michaelis made a speech approving the resolution, but adding “as I understand it.”

The Imperial Chancellor wrote a letter to me in August confirming his very optimistic views of the situation, and defining Germany’s views regarding Belgium.  The phrase, “as I understand it,” above alluded to in his approval of the resolution, was explained in his letter, at any rate, as to the Belgium question:  “As Germany wishes to reserve to herself the right to exercise a far-reaching military and economic influence on Belgium.”  He wrote as follows:—­

  Berlin, August 17, 1917.

DEAR COUNT CZERNIN,—­According to our agreement, I take the liberty briefly to lay before you my views of our discussions of the 14th and 15th inst., and would be extremely grateful if Your Excellency would be so kind as to advise me of your views on my activities.

The internal economic and political situation in Germany justifies me in the firm belief that Germany herself would be able to stand a fourth year of war.  The bread-corn harvest promises better