the sentiments in your report of April 12.  A pessimistic tendency evinced now by the leader of our foreign affairs would ruin everything.  I know that you are prudent, but I beg you to use your influence so that both His Majesty and his entourage may show a confident front to the world.  And again, no one will have anything to say to us if they cease to believe in our powers of resistance—­and are not persuaded that our Alliance rests on a solid foundation.

It was evident that the only right tactics were to make the supremest efforts at the front and throughout the country, on the one hand, in order to hold the situation a little longer, and, on the other, to persuade the enemy that, in spite of the favourable situation, we were prepared for peace without conquest.  To appoint Hebel to the German military Commission to carry out this last procedure seemed devoid of sense.  Neither did I expect to gain much from recent intervention in the Wilhelmstrasse, and endeavoured therefore to put myself in direct touch with the German Reichstag.

One of my political friends who had numerous and excellent connections with the German Reichstag put himself into communication with different leaders in Berlin and explained to them the situation in the Monarchy.  It was understood that this gentleman was not acting for the Ministry, but presenting his own impressions and views.  He was enjoined to be very cautious, as any indiscretion might have incalculable consequences.  If the Entente were to imagine that we were thinking of ending the war, not for love of peace but because we simply could not hold out any longer, all efforts would have been vain.  In that respect, Tisza was perfectly right.  It was, therefore, absolutely necessary that the person to whom this delicate mission had been entrusted should act in such a manner as would keep it a secret from the Entente, a manner devoid of weakness and uniting confidence with reasonable war aims, but also in a manner which would enable the Ministry eventually to disavow the advances.

My friend undertook the task with just as great zeal as efficiency and, in brief, this is what he told the Berlin leaders, Erzberger[9] and Suedekum in particular.  As far as he could judge, we had now reached a turning point.  The next few weeks would decide whether it was to be peace or war a l’outrance.  France was tired and not anxious for America’s entry into the war if it was not to be the latter.  If Germany forced the Entente to continue the war the situation would be very grave.  Neither Austria-Hungary nor Turkey could do more.  Germany, by herself, could not bring the war to a successful end.  Austria-Hungary’s position was obvious to the whole world.  She was ready to make peace without annexations and without war compensation, and to devote all her energies to preventing the recurrence of a war. (Austria-Hungary’s standpoint was that a universal, equal, but extensive disarmament on sea and on land offered the only means to restore the financial situation in Europe after the war.)