offer for peace must be put forward at a time when both political and military initiative are still in our hands.  Count Czernin estimates a suitable time will be in two or three months, when the enemy offensive will be at an end.  As a matter of fact, in view of the French and English expectations of the decisive success for their offensive, and the Entente not having lost all hopes of Russia resuming her activities, any too pronounced preparations for peace would not only be doomed to failure, but would put new life into the enemy by revealing the hopeless exhaustion of the Central Powers’ forces.  At the present moment a general peace could only be bought by our submission to the will of the enemy.  A peace of that nature would not be tolerated by the people and would lead to fatal dangers for the Monarchy.  It appears to me that quiet determination and caution as regards the outer world are more than ever an imperative necessity.  The development of affairs in Russia has hitherto been favourable for us.  Party disputes are kept more and more within the narrow limits of peace and war questions by political, economic and social exigencies, and the impression grows every day that the party which makes for peace with the Central Powers will be the one to remain in power.  It is our solemn duty carefully to follow and encourage the process of development and disruption in Russia and to sound the country, not with too obvious haste, but yet with sufficient expert skill to lead to practical peace negotiations.  The probability is that Russia will avoid any appearance of treachery towards her Allies, and will endeavour to find a method which will practically lead to a state of peace between herself and the Central Powers, but outwardly will have the appearance of the union of both parties as a prelude to the general peace.

As in July, 1914, we entered regardlessly into a loyal alliance with Austria-Hungary, in like manner when the world war is at an end will a basis be found for terms which will guarantee a prosperous peace to the two closely united Monarchies.

This optimistic reply of Bethmann’s was obviously not only based on the idea of infusing more confidence in the future in us, but was also the true expression of a more favourable atmosphere prevailing, as Berlin naturally received the same reports from the enemy countries as we did.

I received about that time a letter from Tisza which contained the following passage:—­

The varied information received from the enemy countries leaves no doubt that the war is drawing to a close.  It is now above all essential to keep a steady nerve and play the game to the end with sangfroid.  Let there be no signs of weakness.  It is not from a love of humanity in general that our enemies have become more peacefully inclined, but because they realise that we cannot be crushed.

I beg of you no longer to give vent to