point that any day it may be expected to snap.  But should serious disturbances occur, either here or in Germany, it will be impossible to conceal the fact from the Entente, and from that moment all further efforts to secure peace will be defeated.

I do not think that the internal situation in Germany is widely different from what it is here.  I am only afraid that the military circles in Berlin are deceiving themselves in certain matters.  I am firmly convinced that Germany, too, like ourselves, has reached the limit of her strength, and the responsible political leaders in Berlin do not seek to deny it.

I am firmly persuaded that, if Germany were to attempt to embark on another winter campaign, there would be an upheaval in the interior of the country which, to my mind, would be far worse than a peace concluded by the Monarchs.  If the Monarchs of the Central Powers are not able to conclude peace within the next few months, it will be done for them by their people, and then will the tide of revolution sweep away all that for which our sons and brothers fought and died.

I do not wish to make any oratio pro domo, but I beg Your Majesty graciously to remember that I, the only one to predict the Roumanian war two years before, spoke to deaf ears, and that when I, two months before the war broke out, prophesied almost the very day when it would begin, nobody would believe me.  I am just as convinced of my present diagnosis as I was of the former one, and I cannot too insistently urge you not to estimate too lightly the dangers that I see ahead.

Without a doubt, the American declaration of war has greatly aggravated the situation.  It may be many months before America can throw any noteworthy forces into the field, but the moral fact, the fact that the Entente has the hope of fresh forces, brings the situation to an unfavourable stage for us, because our enemies have more time before them than we have and can afford to wait longer than we, unfortunately, are able to do.  It cannot yet be said what course events will take in Russia.  I hope—­and this is the vital point of my whole argument—­that Russia has lost her motive power for a long time to come, perhaps for ever, and that this important factor will be made use of.  I expect, nevertheless, that a Franco-English, probably also an Italian, offensive will be launched at the first opportunity, though I hope and trust that we shall be able to repulse both attacks.  If this succeeds—­and I reckon it can be done in two or three months—­we must then, before America takes any further military action to our disadvantage, make a more comprehensive and detailed peace proposal and not shrink from the probably great and heavy sacrifices we may have to make.

Germany places great hopes on the U-boat warfare.  I consider such hopes are deceptive.  I do not for a moment disparage the fabulous deeds