the terms of a conqueror who “grants” peace terms to the enemy.  Although I will not attempt to deny that the tone of the peace proposal was very arrogant—­an impression which must have been enhanced by Tisza’s speeches in the Hungarian Parliament—­I think, nevertheless, that even had it been differently worded it had small prospect of success.  However that may be, the stern refusal on the part of the Entente only strengthened the situation for the war-keen military party, who, with increased vehemence, maintained the point that all talk of peace was a mistake, and that the fighting must go on to the end.

In the winter of 1917, Italy made a slight advance.  What territorial concessions was the Monarchy prepared to make?  This did not proceed from the Italian Government, but was a step taken by a private individual which was communicated to me through a friendly Government.  It is extremely difficult to judge of the true value of such a step.  A Government can make use of a private individual to take the first step—­it will probably do so when intercourse is desired; but it may also be that a private person, without instructions from, or the knowledge of, his Government, might do the same.  Instances of the latter occurred frequently during my term of office.

I always held the standpoint that any such tentative steps for peace, even when a ministerial source could not be proved a priori, should be treated with prudence, but in a friendly spirit.  In the above-mentioned case, however, the fact was that Italy neither could separate from her Allies, nor did she wish to do so.  Had that been her purpose, it would have involved her in a conflict with England, whose aim in war was the conquest of Germany and not any Italian aspirations.  A separate peace with Italy—­her separation from her Allies—­was entirely out of the question, but a general peace would have been possible if the Western Powers could have come to an understanding with Germany.

The only object gained by that appeal would have been to confirm the extent of our exhaustion from the war.  Had I answered that I was ready to give up this or that province, it would have been interpreted as a conclusive symptom of our increasing weakness, and would not have brought peace any nearer, but rather kept it at a greater distance.

I answered, therefore, in friendly tone that the Monarchy did not aim at conquests, and that I was ready to negotiate on the basis of pre-war conditions of possession.  No answer was sent.

After the downfall I was told by a person, certainly not competent to judge, that my tactics had been mistaken, as Italy would have separated from her Allies and concluded a separate peace.  Further accounts given in this chapter prove the injustice of the reproof.  But it is easy now to confirm the impression that there was not a single moment while the war lasted when Italy ever thought of leaving her Allies.