And how has it all come about?  Simply thus:  The Saxon was a Saxon, the Bavarian was a Bavarian; each suddenly found himself a German and part of a world-power.  Bismarck and Von Moltke had a policy for the Hohenzollerns; it was a united Germany, and they left it a defensive Germany.

There was not in the brain of Bismarck or of Von Moltke, or of the Emperor under whom they prosecuted the wars against Austria, Denmark, and France, any idea of Germany as the Conqueror of the world.

“Never be at enmity with the Russian Bear,” was the saying at the time of Bismarck and before.  “Always contrive that yours shall be a defensive war; let the other party attack,” was the declaration of Bismarck.

The policy of Bismarck was:  “If you have an enemy, make friends with all the other powers, so that your enemy be isolated diplomatically and politically.”

The present Kaiser has reversed every one of the great policies of Bismarck and of his ancestors that made a united and great Germany.

There is not a language in the world to-day outside the Teutonic that speaks the praise of Germany.  Defensive German alliances are broken because the present Kaiser insisted that offensive and defensive are one and the same.  In offensive action the Triple Alliance breaks; while the Triple Entente becomes, for defense, nine nations instead of three.

The German people are not responsible for this situation.  Their form of government has not yet permitted full, free, and effective expression of opinion; nor does the German seek full political expression.  He loves his fireside and his family, and prefers his home ease and philosophy.  He has confidence in his Kaiser and his government; and his whole training for a generation has been to make him an obedient part of a military power.

It is gratifying to find that not the German people, but the German Kaiser, is responsible for this war; and it is also gratifying to find that there are doubts as to his full mental responsibility.

I have had closer associations with the German people than with the French, and have liked them better as a people:  they are so industrious, efficient, and ambitious in the world’s work.  I know the German country better than the country of France or England.  I think I understand something of the over-self-sufficiency of the English, and I have no prejudice against the Germans, or even their form of government, which may be better adapted to their needs than a broader democracy.  But of the German modern war-philosophy the world outside can hold but one opinion.  It might have been supported as a purely tentative or speculative philosophy, but it could have been promoted in practice only by a crazy ruler.  I was not therefore surprised to find circulated in Paris an article by an American physician which I had permitted to be published in America at the outbreak of the war, showing the mental weaknesses and hereditary taints of Germany’s war lord.