At the same time, the defensive attitude adopted at the beginning of the Somme campaign was repudiated.  The order of the day became strong concentration, likely to secure, at least in one sector, decided superiority in the air, even if other sectors must be left destitute or battle shirked.  The flying men were never to be over-worked, so as to be fresh in an emergency.  The subordination of aviation to the other services was evidently an inspiration from the French regulation saying:  “The aviation forces shall be always ready to attack, but in perfect subordination to the orders of the commanding officers.”

In spite of this readiness to attack, the enemy recommended prudence in scouting and patrolling work.  The airman was not to engage in a fight without special orders.  He seldom cruises by himself, and most often is one of five.  To one Boelcke, fond of high altitudes and given to pouncing falconlike on his prey, like Guynemer, there are scores of Richtofens who, under careful protection from other airplanes, circle round and round trying to attract the enemy, and unexpectedly getting behind him by a spiral or a loop.  It should be said here that the German controlling boards take the pilot’s word concerning the number of his victories instead of requiring, as the French do, the evidence of eye witnesses.  The high figures generously allowed to a Richtofen or a Werner Voss are less creditable than the strictly controlled record of a Guynemer, a Nungesser, or a Dorme.

The enemy expected in April, 1917, a massive attack from the French air forces in the Aisne, and had taken measures to evade it.  An order from the staff of the Seventh Army says that all flying units shall be given the alarm whenever a large number of French airplanes are sighted.  The German machines must return to camp at once, refusing combat except on equal terms; and balloons must be lowered, or even pulled down to the ground.  If, on the contrary, the German machines took the offensive, the order was that, at the hour determined upon, all available machines must rise together to a low altitude, and divide into two distinct fleets, the chasing units flying above the rest.  These two fleets must then make for the point of attack, gaining height as they go, and must engage the enemy above the lines with the utmost energy, never giving up the pursuit until they reach the French lines, when the danger from anti-aircraft batteries becomes too great.

From this it is evident that the preference of German Aviation for taking the offensive was not sufficient to induce it to offer battle above the enemy lines, and the tendency of the staff was to group squadrons into overpowering masses.  The French had preceded their opponents in the way of technical progress, but the Germans made up for the inferiority, as usual, by method and system.  The French were unrivaled for technical improvements, and the training of their pilots.  Their new machine, the Spad, was a first-rate instrument, superior in strength, speed, and ease of control to the best Albatros, and the Germans knew that this inferiority must be obviated.  All modern battles are thus preceded by technical rivalry.  The preparation in factories, week after week, and month after month, ultimately results in living machinery which the staff uses as it pleases.