Ever since the establishment of our first autonomous group of fighting airplanes, which figured in the Artois offensives in May, 1915, but which did not take the offensive (having their cantonments in the barriers and limiting themselves to keeping off the enemy and cruising above our lines and often behind them), our fighting airplanes gradually overcame prejudice.  They were not, it is true, so promptly brought to perfection as our army corps airplanes, which proved so useful in the Champagne campaign of September, 1915; but it was admitted that the aerial combat should not be regarded as a result of mere chance, but as inevitable, and that it constituted, first, a protection, and afterwards an effective obstruction to an enemy forbidden to make raids in our aerial domain.  The next German offensive—­against Verdun—­had been foreseen.  In consequence, the staff had organized a safety service to avoid all surprise by the enemy, to meet attacks, and prepare the way for the reinforcing troops.  But the violence of the Verdun offensive exceeded all expectations.

Our escadrilles had done their duty as scouts before the attack.  After it began, they were overwhelmed and numerically unable to perform all the aerial missions required.  The fighting enemy escadrilles, with their new series of machines and their improvements, won for a few days the complete mastery of the air.  Our own airplanes were forced off the battle-field, and driven from their landing-places by cannon.  Meanwhile the Verdun battle was changing its character.  General Petain, who took command on February 26, restored the order which had been compromised by the bending of the front, and established the new front against which the Germans hurled their forces.  It was also necessary for him to reconquer the mastery of the air.  He asked for and obtained a rapid concentration of all the available escadrilles, and demanded of them vigorous offensive tactics.  To economize and cooerdinate strength, all the fighting escadrilles at Verdun were grouped under the sole command of Major de Rose.  They operated by patrols, sometimes following very distant itineraries, and attacking all the airplanes they met.  In a short time we regained our air supremacy, and our airplanes which were engaged in regulating artillery fire and in taking aerial photographs could work in safety.  Their protection was assured by raids even into the German lines.

The Storks Escadrille, then, flew in the direction of Verdun.  In the course of the voyage, Guynemer brought down his eighth airplane, which fell vertically in flames.  This was a good augury.  Hardly had he arrived on March 15 when he began to explore the battle-field with his conqueror’s eyes.  The enemy at that time still thought himself master, and dared to venture within the French lines.  Guynemer chased, over Revigny, a group of five airplanes, drove another out of Argonne, and while returning met two others, almost face to face.  He engaged