thrown back on the Duena.  Lewis vainly sought for an outlet; he found his enemy every where, and lost at first two battalions and a squadron.  He would have infallibly been taken with his whole force, had he been pressed closer, but he was allowed sufficient space and time to take breath; as the cold increased, and the country offered no means of escape, he ventured to trust himself to the weak ice which had begun to cover the river.  He made his troops lay a bed of straw and boards over it, in that manner crossed the Duena at two points between Friedrichstadt and Lindau, and re-entered Riga, at the very moment his comrades had begun to despair of his preservation.

The day after this engagement, Macdonald was informed of the retreat of Napoleon on Smolensk, but not of the disorganization of the army.  A few days after, some sinister reports brought him the news of the capture of Minsk.  He began to be alarmed, when, on the 4th of December, a letter from Maret, magnifying the victory of the Berezina, announced to him the capture of nine thousand Russians, nine standards, and twelve cannon.  The admiral, according to this letter, was reduced to thirteen thousand men.

On the third of December the Russians were again repulsed in one of their sallies from Riga, by the Prussians.  Yorck, either from prudence or conscience, restrained himself.  Macdonald had become reconciled to him.  On the 19th of December, fourteen days after the departure of Napoleon, eight days after the capture of Wilna by Kutusoff, in short when Macdonald commenced his retreat, the Prussian army was still faithful.

CHAP.  VIII.

It was from Wilna, on the 9th of December, that orders were transmitted to Macdonald, of which a Prussian officer was the bearer, directing him to retreat slowly upon Tilsit.  No care was taken to send these instructions by different channels.  They did not even think of employing Lithuanians to carry a message of that importance.  In this manner the last army, the only one which remained unbroken, was exposed to the risk of destruction.  An order, which was written at the distance of only four days’ journey from Macdonald, lingered so long on the road, that it was nine days in reaching him.

The marshal directed his retreat on Tilsit, by passing between Telzs and Szawlia.  Yorck, with the greatest part of the Prussians, forming his rear-guard, marched at a day’s distance from him, in contact with the Russians, and left entirely to themselves.  By some this was regarded as a great error on the part of Macdonald; but the majority did not venture to decide, alleging that in a situation so delicate, confidence and suspicion were alike dangerous.

The latter also said that the French marshal did every thing which prudence required of him, by retaining with him one of Yorck’s divisions; the other, which was commanded by Massenbach, was under the direction of the French general Bachelu, and formed the vanguard.  The Prussian army was thus separated into two corps, Macdonald in the middle, and the one seemed to be a guarantee to him for the other.