[Footnote 12:  The Duke of Frioul, the Count de Segur, the Duke of Vicenza.]

“Was it not notorious, that all the elements protected these countries from the first of October to the first of June? that, at any other time than the short interval comprised between these two epochs, an army engaged in those deserts of mud and ice might perish there entirely, and ingloriously?” And, they added, “that Lithuania was much more Asiatic than Spain was African; and that the French army, already all but banished from France by a perpetual war, wished at least to preserve its European character.

“Finally, when face to face with the enemy in these deserts, what different motives must actuate the different armies!  On the side of the Russians were country, independence, every description of interest, private and public, even to the secret good wishes of our allies!  On our side, and in the teeth of so many obstacles, glory alone, unassociated even with that desire of gain, to which the frightful poverty of these countries offered no attraction.

“And what is the end of so many exertions?  The French already no longer recognized each other, in the midst of a country now uncircumscribed by any natural frontier; and in which the diversity was so great in manners, persons, and languages.”  On this particular point, the eldest[13] of these great officers added, “That such an extension was never made without proportionate exhaustion; that it was blotting out France to merge it in Europe; for, in fact, when France should become Europe, it would be France no longer.  Would not the meditated departure leave her solitary, deserted, without a ruler, without an army, accessible to every diversion?  Who then was there to defend her?” “My renown!” exclaimed the emperor:  “I leave my name behind me, and the fear inspired by a nation in arms.”

[Footnote 13:  M. de Segur.]

And, without appearing in the least shaken by so many objections, he announced “that he was about to organize the empire into cohorts of Ban and Arriere Ban; and without mistrust to leave to Frenchmen the protection of France, of his crown, and of his glory.

“That as to Prussia, he had secured her tranquillity by the impossibility in which he had placed her of moving, even in case of his defeat, or of a descent of the English on the coasts of the North Sea, and in our rear; that he held in his hands the civil and military power of that kingdom; that he was master of Stettin, Custrin, Glogau, Torgau, Spandau, and Magdeburg; that he would post some clear-sighted officers at Colberg, and an army at Berlin; and that with these means, and supported by the fidelity of Saxony, he had nothing to fear from Prussian hatred.