But great errors are seldom repaired with the same readiness with which they are committed; either because it is in our nature to be at first doubtful of them, and that no one is disposed to admit them until they are completely certain; or because they confuse, and in the distrust of our own judgment, we hesitate, and require the support of other opinions.

Thus it was, that the admiral lost the remainder of the 26th and the whole of the 27th in consultations, in feeling his way, and in preparations.  The presence of Napoleon and his grand army, of the weakness of which it was impossible for him to have any idea, dazzled him.  He saw the Emperor every where; before his right, in the simulated preparations for a passage; opposite his centre at Borizof, because in fact the arrival of the successive portions of our army filled that place with movements; and finally, at Studzianka before his left, where the Emperor really was.

On the 27th, so little had he recovered from his error that he made his chasseurs reconnoitre and attack Borizof; they crossed over upon the beams of the burnt bridge, but were repulsed by the soldiers of Partouneaux’s division.

On the same day, while he was thus irresolute, Napoleon, with about five thousand guards, and Ney’s corps, now reduced to six hundred men, crossed the Berezina about two o’clock in the afternoon; he posted himself in reserve to Oudinot, and secured the outlet from the bridges against Tchitchakof’s future efforts.

He had been preceded by a crowd of baggage and stragglers.  Numbers of them continued to cross the river after him as long as daylight lasted.  The army of Victor, at the same time, succeeded the guard in its position on the heights of Studzianka.

CHAP.  VII.

Hitherto all had gone on well.  But Victor, in passing through Borizof, had left there Partouneaux with his division.  That general had orders to stop the enemy in the rear of that town, to drive before him the numerous stragglers who had taken shelter there, and to rejoin Victor before the close of the day.  It was the first time that Partouneaux had seen the disorder of the grand army.  He was anxious, like Davoust at the beginning of the retreat, to hide the traces of it from the Cossacks of Kutusoff, who were at his heels.  This fruitless attempt, the attacks of Platof by the high road of Orcha, and those of Tchitchakof by the burnt bridge of Borizof, detained him in that place until the close of the day.

He was preparing to quit it, when an order reached him from the Emperor himself, to remain there all night.  Napoleon’s idea, no doubt, was, in that manner to direct the whole attention of the three Russian generals upon Borizof, and that Partouneaux’s keeping them back upon that point, would allow him sufficient time to operate the passage of his whole army.

But Wittgenstein left Platof to pursue the French army along the high road, and directed his own march more to the right.  He debouched the same evening on the heights which border the Berezina, between Borizof and Studzianka, intercepted the road between these two points, and captured all that was found there.  A crowd of stragglers, who were driven back on Partouneaux, apprised him that he was separated from the rest of the army.