We were now approaching the most critical moment; Victor was in the rear with 15,000 men; Oudinot in front with 5,000, and already on the Berezina; the Emperor, between them, with 7,000 men, 40,000 stragglers, and an enormous quantity of baggage and artillery, the greatest part of which belonged to the second and the ninth corps.

On the 25th, as he was about to reach the Berezina, he appeared to linger on his march.  He halted every instant on the high road, waiting for night to conceal his arrival from the enemy, and to allow the Duke of Reggio time to evacuate Borizof.

This marshal, when he entered that town upon the 23d, found the bridge, which was 300 fathoms in length, destroyed at three different points, and that the vicinity of the enemy rendered it impossible to repair it.  He had ascertained, that on his left, two miles lower down the river, there was, near Oukoholda, a deep and unsafe ford; that at the distance of a mile above Borizof, namely, at Stadhof, there was another, but of difficult approach.  Finally, he had learned within the last two days, that at Studzianka, two leagues above Stadhof, there was a third passage;—­for the knowledge of this he was indebted to Corbineau’s brigade.

This was the same brigade which the Bavarian general, De Wrede, had taken from the second corps, in his march to Smoliantzy.  He had retained it until he reached Dokszitzi, from whence he sent it back to the second corps by way of Borizof.  When Corbineau arrived there, he found Tchitchakof already in possession of it, and was compelled to make his retreat by ascending the Berezina, and concealing his force in the forests which border that river.  Not knowing at what point to cross it, he accidentally saw a Lithuanian peasant, whose horse seemed to be quite wet, as if he had just come through it.  He laid hold of this man, and made him his guide; he got up behind him, and crossed the river at a ford opposite to Studzianka.  He immediately rejoined Oudinot, and informed him of the discovery he had made.

As Napoleon’s intention was to retreat directly upon Wilna, the marshal saw at once that this passage was the most direct, as well as the least dangerous.  It was also observed, that even if our infantry and artillery should be too closely pressed by Wittgenstein and Kutusoff, and prevented from crossing the river on bridges, there was at least a certainty, from the ford having been tried, that the Emperor and the cavalry would be able to pass; that all would not then be lost, both peace and war, as if Napoleon himself remained in the enemy’s hands.  The marshal therefore did not hesitate.  In the night of the 23d, the general of artillery, a company of pontonniers, a regiment of infantry, and the brigade Corbineau, took possession of Studzianka.

At the same time the other two passages were reconnoitred, and both found to be strongly observed.  The object therefore was to deceive and displace the enemy.  As force could do nothing, recourse was had to stratagem; in furtherance of which, on the 24th, three hundred men and several hundred stragglers were sent towards Oukoholda, with instructions to collect there, with as much noise as possible, all the necessary materials for the construction of a bridge; the whole division of the cuirassiers was also made to promenade on that side within view of the enemy.