The effort which he had made to reach Moscow had expended all his means of warfare.  Moscow had been the term of his projects, the aim of all his hopes, and Moscow was no more!  What was now to be done?  Here this decisive genius was forced to hesitate.  He, who in 1805 had ordered the sudden and total abandonment of an expedition, prepared at an immense cost, and determined at Bologne-sur-mer on the surprise and annihilation of the Austrian army, in short, all the operations of the campaign between Ulm and Munich exactly as they were executed; the same man, who, the following year, dictated at Paris with the same infallibility all the movements of his army as far as Berlin, the day fixed for his entrance into that capital, and the appointment of the governor whom he destined for it—­he it was, who, astonished in his turn, was now undecided what course to pursue.  Never had he communicated his most daring projects to the most confidential of his ministers but in the order for their execution; he was now constrained to consult, and put to the proof, the moral and physical energies of those about him.

In doing this, however, he still preserved the same forms.  He declared, therefore, that he should march for Petersburg.  This conquest was already marked out on his maps, hitherto so prophetic:  orders were even issued to the different corps to hold themselves in readiness.  But his decision was only a feint:  it was but a better face that he strove to assume, or an expedient for diverting his grief for the loss of Moscow:  so that Berthier, and more especially Bessieres, soon convinced him that he had neither time, provisions, roads, nor a single requisite for so extensive an excursion.

At this moment he was apprised that Kutusoff, after having fled eastward, had suddenly turned to the south, and thrown himself between Moscow and Kalouga.  This was an additional motive against the expedition to Petersburg; there was a threefold reason for marching upon this beaten army for the purpose of extinguishing it; to secure his right flank and his line of operation; to possess himself of Kalouga and Toula, the granary and arsenal of Russia; and lastly, to open a safe, short, new, and virgin retreat to Smolensk and Lithuania.

Some one proposed to return upon Wittgenstein and Witepsk.  Napoleon was undecided between all these plans.  That for the conquest of Petersburg alone flattered him:  the others appeared but as ways of retreat, as acknowledgments of error; and whether from pride, or policy which will not admit itself to be in the wrong, he rejected them.

Besides, where was he to stop in a retreat?  He had so fully calculated on concluding a peace at Moscow, that he had no winter quarters provided in Lithuania.  Kalouga had no temptations for him.  Wherefore lay waste fresh provinces?  It would be wiser to threaten them, and leave the Russians something to lose, in order to induce them to conclude a peace by which it might be preserved.  Would it be possible to march to another battle, to fresh conquests, without exposing a line of operation, covered with sick, stragglers, wounded and convoys of all sorts?  Moscow was the general rallying point; how could it be changed?  What other name would have any attraction?