Barnave at length spoke, and in support of Salles’ opinion.  He said:  “The French nation has just undergone a violent shock; but if we are to believe all the auguries which are delivered, this recent event, like all others which have preceded it, will only serve to advance the period, to confirm the solidity of the revolution we have effected.  I will not dilate on the advantages of monarchical government:  you have proved your conviction by establishing it in your country:  I will only say that every government, to be good, should comprise within itself the principles of its stability:  for otherwise, instead of prosperity there would be before us only the perspective of a series of changes.  Some men, whose motives I shall not impugn, seeking for examples to adduce, have found, in America, a people occupying a vast territory with a scanty population, nowhere surrounded by very powerful neighbours, having forests for their boundaries, and having for customs the feelings of a new race, and who are wholly ignorant of those factitious passions and impulses which effect revolutions of government.  They have seen a republican government established in that land, and have thence drawn the conclusion that a similar government was suitable for us.  These men are the same who at this moment are contesting the inviolability of the king.  But, if it be true that in our territory there is a vast population spread,—­if it be true that there are amongst them a multitude of men exclusively given up to those intellectual speculations which excite ambition and the love of fame,—­if it be true that around us powerful neighbours compel us to form but one compact body in order to resist them,—­if it be true that all these circumstances are irresistible, and are wholly independent of ourselves, it is undeniable that the sole existing remedy lies in a monarchical government.  When a country is populous and extensive, there are—­and political experience proves it—­but two modes of assuring to it a solid and permanent existence.  Either you must organise those parts separately;—­you must place in each section of the empire a portion of the government, and thus you will maintain security at the expense of unity, strength, and all the advantages which result from a great and homogeneous association:—­or else you will be forced to centralise an unchangeable power, which, never renewed by the law, presenting incessantly obstacles to ambition, resists with advantage the shocks, rivalries, and rapid vibrations of an immense population, agitated by all the passions engendered by long established society.  These facts decide our position.  We can only be strong through a federative government, which no one here has the madness to propose, or by a monarchical government, such as you have established; that is to say, by confiding the reins of the executive power to a family having the right of hereditary succession.  You have intrusted to an inviolable king the exclusive function