These two obstacles removed, nothing now kept France and Europe on terms but the feeble cabinet of Louis XVI.  The impatience of the nation, the ambition of the Girondists, and the resentment of the constitutionalists wounded through M. de Narbonne, united them to overthrow this cabinet.  Brissot, Vergniaud, Guadet, Condorcet, Gensonne, Petion, their friends in the Assembly, the council-chamber of Madame Roland, their Seids amongst the Jacobins balanced between two ambitions—­equally open to their abilities—­to destroy power or seize on it.  Brissot counselled this latter measure.  More conversant with politics than the young orators of the Gironde, he did not comprehend the Revolution without government; anarchy, in his opinion, did not destroy the monarchy more than it did liberty.  The greater were events, the more necessary was the direction of them.  Placed disarmed in the foremost rank of the Assembly and of opinion, power presented itself, and it was necessary to lay hands upon it.  Once in their grasp, they would make of it, according to the dictates of fortune and the will of the people, a monarchy or a republic.  Ready for any thing that would allow them to reign in the name of the king or of the people, this counsel was pleasing to men who had scarcely emerged from obscurity, and who, seduced by the facility of their good fortune, seized on it at its first smile.  Men who ascend quickly, easily become giddy.

Still a very profound line of policy was disclosed in the secret council of the Girondists, in the choice of the men whom they put forward, and whom they presented for ministers to the king.

Brissot in this gave evidence of the patience of consummate ambition.  He inspired Vergniaud, Petion, Guadet, Gensonne, as well as all the leading men of his party, with similar patience.  He remained with them in the twilight close to power, but not included in the projected ministry, being desirous of feeling the pulse of popular opinion through secondary men, who could be disavowed or sacrificed at need, and keeping in reserve himself and the leaders of the Girondists, either to support or overthrow this weak and transitory ministry, if the nation should resolve upon more decisive measures.  Brissot, and those who acted with him, were thus ready at all points, as well to direct as to replace power—­they were masters without any responsibility.  The doctrines of Machiavel were very perceptible in this tactic of statesmen.  Besides, by abstaining from entering into the first cabinet, they would remain popular, and maintain, in the Assembly and Jacobins, those voices of power which would have been stifled in an administration.  Popularity was requisite for their contest with Robespierre, who was treading so closely on their heels, and who would soon be at the head of opinion if they abandoned it to him.  On entering upon their course they affected for this rival more contempt than they really felt.  Robespierre, single-handed, balanced their