Moreover, as has been shown, Vergniaud and his party had friends in the council.  M. de Narbonne and the Girondists met and concerted their plans at Madame de Staeel’s, whose salon, in which some warlike measure was always being discussed, was called the camp of the Revolution:  the Abbe Fauchet, the denouncer of M. de Lessart, here imbibed fresh ardour for the overthrow of this minister.  M. de Lessart, by weakening as much as possible the threats of the court of Vienna and the anger of the Assembly, sought to gain time for better and wiser resolutions.  His loyal attachment to Louis XVI., and his wise and prudent foresight, showed him that war would not restore, but shake the throne; and in this shock of Europe and France, the king would inevitably be crushed.  The attachment of M. de Lessart to his master supplied the place of genius; he was the only obstacle in the path of the three parties who wished for war; it was necessary, at all risks, to remove him.  He might have shielded himself by withdrawing from the contest, or by yielding to the impatience of the Assembly.  But, though fully aware of the terrible responsibility that rested on him, and that this responsibility was death, he braved all, to afford the king a few days more for negotiation.—­These days were numbered.

BOOK XII.

I.

Leopold, a pacific and philosophic prince, who had he not been an emperor, would have been a revolutionist, had sought by every means in his power to adjourn the concussion between the two principles; he only demanded from France such concessions as would enable him to repress the ardour of Prussia, Germany, and Russia.  The prince de Kaunitz, his minister, continually wrote to M. de Lessart in this strain; and the private communications which the king received from his ambassador at the court of Vienna, the Marquis de Noailles, breathed the same spirit of conciliation.  Leopold only desired that guarantees should be given to the monarchical powers for the establishment of order in France, and that the constitution should be vigorously enforced by the executive power.  But the last sittings of the Assembly, the armaments of M. de Narbonne, the accusations of Brissot, the fiery speeches of Vergniaud, and the applause he had gained, began to weary his patience; and the desire for war, so long repressed, now, in spite of himself, took possession of him.  “The French wish for war,” said he one day; “they shall have it—­they shall see that the peaceful Leopold can be warlike when the interest of his people demands it.”

The cabinet councils at Vienna became more frequent, in presence of the emperor.  Russia had just concluded peace with the Ottoman empire, and was thus enabled to turn her eyes to France; Sweden fanned the flame of all the princes; Prussia yielded to the advice of Leopold; England observed, but pledged herself to nothing, for the struggle on the Continent would increase her importance.  The armaments were decided upon, and on the 7th of February, 1792, the definitive treaty of alliance between Austria and Prussia was signed at Berlin.  “Now,” wrote Leopold to Frederic William, “it is France who menaces—­who arms—­who provokes:  Europe must arm.”