Such were the oracular utterances:  now what befell the Romans was this. [Sidenote:  FRAG. 56^21] THE COMMANDERS WERE AEMILIUS PAULUS AND TERENTIUS VARRO, MEN NOT OF SIMILAR TEMPERAMENT.  FOR THE ONE WAS A PATRICIAN, POSSESSED OF THE GRACES OF EDUCATION, AND ESTEEMED SAFETY BEFORE HASTE:  BUT TERENTIUS HAD BEEN BROUGHT UP AMONG THE RABBLE, WAS PRACTICED IN VULGAR BRAVADO, AND SO DISPLAYED LACK OF PRUDENCE IN NEARLY ALL RESPECTS, THINKING, FOR INSTANCE, THAT HE ALONE SHOULD HAVE THE LEADERSHIP IN VIEW OF THE QUIET BEHAVIOR OF HIS COLLEAGUE.  NOW THEY BOTH REACHED THE CAMP AT A MOST OPPORTUNE TIME:  HANNIBAL HAD NO LONGER ANY PROVENDER; SPAIN WAS IN TURMOIL; THE AFFECTION OF THE ALLIES WAS BEING ALIENATED FROM HIM; AND IF THEY HAD WAITED FOR EVEN THE BRIEFEST POSSIBLE PERIOD, THEY WOULD HAVE CONQUERED. AS MATTERS WENT, HOWEVER, THE RECKLESSNESS OF TERENTIUS AND THE SUBMISSIVENESS OF PAULUS COMPASSED THEIR DEFEAT.  Hannibal attempted to lead them into a conflict at once, and with a few followers drew near their stronghold:  then, when a sortie was made, he purposely fell back to create the impression of being afraid and so drew them the more surely into a set battle.  But, as Paulus restrained his own soldiers from pursuit, Hannibal simulated terror and that night packed up as if to depart; and he left behind him numerous articles lying within the palisade and ordered the rest of the baggage to be escorted with a considerable show of carelessness so as to make the Romans devote their attention to plundering it and give him thereby a chance to attack them.  He would have translated his wish into fact, if Paulus had not held back his soldiers, in spite of their reluctance, and held back Terentius as well.

So Hannibal, having failed in this essay also, came by night to Cannae, and since he knew the place as one fit for ambuscades and for a pitched battle, he encamped there.  And first he ploughed the whole site over, because it had a sandy subsoil and his object was to have a cloud of dust raised in the conflict; the wind generally springs up there in summer toward noon, and he contrived to get it behind his back.  The consuls seeing at dawn that his stockade was empty of men at first waited, apprehending ambush, but later in the broad daylight came to Cannae.  Each of the Roman leaders bivouacked apart beside the river, for since they were not congenial they avoided association together.  Paulus remained quiet, but Terentius was anxious to force the issue; when he saw, however, that the soldiers were rather listless, he gave up the idea.  But Hannibal, who was determined to goad them into battle even against their will, shut them off from their sources of water, prevented their scattering into small parties, and threw the bodies of the slain into the stream above their intrenchments and in plain sight, in order to disgust them with the drinking supply.  Then the Romans started to array themselves for battle.  Hannibal anticipating this movement had planted ambuscades at the foot of the hills but held the remainder of his army drawn up.  He also ordered some men at a given signal to simulate desertion; they were to throw away their shields and spears and larger swords but secretly to retain their daggers, so that after his antagonists had received them as unarmed, they might attack them unexpectedly.