It is clear from the accompanying sketch map that the position the British had now reached gave to the whole Allied force a bent contour.  The French armies to the east lay along line AB, which, had it been directly prolonged, would have stretched towards C; but the British contingent, which, on account of its extreme position, had suffered most heavily, was turned right back on the scheme AD, and even so, was still in some peril of being outflanked by the German forces along the arrow (1) to the west of it.  At this moment the French, whose fortunes we shall next describe, found it possible to check the fury of the pursuit.  The drive of the German masses, which had so nearly annihilated the British end of the line, was blocked, and the remainder of the great retreat followed a more orderly fashion, proceeded at a much slower rate, and approached that term at which a counter-offensive might be attempted.

The whole process may be compared to the flood of a very rapid tide, which, after the first few hours, is seen to relax its speed considerably, and to promise in the immediate future an ebb.

In order to appreciate how this was, let us next consider what the larger French forces to the east of the British had been doing.  There are no details available, very few published records, and it will not be possible until an official history of the war appears to give more than the most general sketch of the French movements in this retreat; but the largest lines are sufficient for our judgment of the result.

It will be remembered that what I have called “the operative corner” of the Allied army had stood in the angle between the Sambre and the Meuse.  It had consisted in the British contingent upon the left, or west, in front of Mons; the 5th French Army, composed of three army corps, under Lanrezac, to the east of it, along the Sambre, past Charleroi; and the 4th French Army, also of three army corps, under Langle, along the Middle Meuse, being in general disposition what we have upon the accompanying sketch.  It had been attacked upon Saturday, the 22nd August, by seventeen German army corps—­that is, by forces double its own.  On that same day Namur, at the corner, had fallen into complete possession of the Germans, the French retreat had begun, and on the following day the English force had, after the regrettable delay of half a day, also begun its retirement.

We have seen that the British retirement (following the dotted lines upon Sketch 60) had reached, upon the Friday night, the position from Noyon to La Fere, marked also in dots upon the sketch.

What had happened meanwhile to their French colleagues upon the east?

[Illustration:  Sketch 60.]

The first thing to note is that the fortress of Maubeuge, with its garrison of reserve and second line men, had, of course, been at once invested by the Germans when the British and French line had fallen behind it and left it isolated.  The imperfection of this fortress I have already described, and the causes of that imperfection.  Maubeuge commanded the great railway line leading from Belgium to Paris, which is the main avenue of supply for an invasion or for a retreat, running north-east to south-west on the Belgian frontier upon the capital.