It will be seen that this line was bent—­its left refused.  This disposition was, of course, designed to meet the ceaseless German attempt to outflank on the west; and with the dawn of Wednesday, the 26th, it was already apparent how serious would be the task before this 2nd Corps, which covered all the rest of the army, and, in a sense, the whole of the Anglo-French retirement.  General Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien, who was here in command, was threatened with a disaster that might carry in its train disaster to the whole British contingent, and ultimately, perhaps, to the whole Franco-British line.

Although the German bodies which were attempting the outflanking had not yet all come up, the field artillery of no less than four German corps was already at work against this one body, and a general action was developing upon which might very well depend the fate of the campaign.  Indeed, the reader will do well to fix his attention upon this day, Wednesday, the 26th August, as the key to all that followed.  There are always to be found, in the history of war, places and times which are of this character—­nuclei, as it were, round which the business of all that comes before and after seems to congregate.  Of such, for instance, was the Friday before Waterloo, when Erlon’s counter-orders ultimately decided the fate of Napoleon; and of such was Carnot’s night march on October 15, 1793, which largely decided the fate of the revolutionary army.

The obvious action to take in such a position as that in which the 2nd Corps found themselves was to break contact with the enemy, to call for support from the 1st Corps, and to maintain the retreat as indefatigably as it had already been maintained in the preceding twenty-four hours.

But men have limits to their physical powers, which limits commonly appear sharply, not gradually, at the end of a great movement.  The 1st Corps had been marching and fighting a day and a night, and that after a preceding whole day of retirement from before Mons. It was unable to execute a further effort.  Further, the general in command of the 2nd Corps reported that the German pressure had advanced too far to permit of breaking contact in the face of such an attack.

It would have been of the utmost use if at this moment a large body of French cavalry—­no less than three divisions—­under General Sordet, could have intervened upon that critical moment, the morning of Wednesday, the 26th, to have covered the retirement of the 1st Corps.  They were in the neighbourhood; the British commander had seen their commander in the course of the 25th, and had represented his need.  Through some error or misfortune in the previous movement of this corps—­such that its horses were incapable of further action through fatigue—­it failed to appear upon the field in this all-important juncture, and General Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien was left facing overwhelming odds, which in artillery—­the arm that was doing all the heavy work of that morning—­were not less than four to one.