Russia put into the field during the first weeks of the war some million and a quarter, which grew during the first period (that is, before the coming of winter had created a very serious handicap, to which allusion will presently be made) to perhaps two million and a half at the very most.  I put that number as an outside limit.

Servia, of men actually present and able to fight, we may set down at a quarter of a million; and Belgium, if we like, at one hundred thousand—­though the Belgian service being still in a state of transition, and the degree of training very varied within it, that minor point is disputable.  Indeed it is better, in taking a general survey, to consider only the five Great Powers concerned.

Of these the fifth, Great Britain, though destined to exercise by sea power and by her recruiting field a very great ultimate effect upon the war, could only provide, in this first period upon the Continent, an average of one hundred thousand men.  To begin with, some seventy-five thousand, dwindling through losses to little more than fifty thousand, replenished and increased to about one hundred and twenty-five thousand, and approaching, as the end of the first period was reached, one hundred and fifty thousand men actually present upon the front.

We can now set down these figures in the shape of simple units, and see how the numerical chances stood at the opening of the campaign.

The enemy sets out with =32= men, of whom he bids =10= men against the Russians, and sends =22= against the French.  The Russians meet the =10= men with about =12=, and the French meet the =22= with about =10=; but as they have not the whole =22= to meet in the first shock, they are struck rather in the proportion of =10= to =16= or =17=, while the presence of the British contingent makes them rather more than =101/2=.  But these initial figures rapidly change with the growth of the armies, and before the first period is over the Germans have =22= in the West against =15= French and =1= British, making =16=; while in the East the Russian =12= has grown to, say, =24=, but the Austro-Germans in the East, against those =24=, have grown to be quite =32=.  And there is the numerical situation of the first period clearly, and I think accurately, put, supposing the wastage to be equal in proportion throughout all the armies.  The importance of appreciating these figures is that they permit us to understand why the enemy was morally certain of winning, quite apart from his right judgment on certain disputed theories of war (to which I shall turn in a moment), and quite apart from his heavy secret munitioning, which was of such effect in the earlier part of the campaign.  He was ready with forces which he knew would be overwhelming, and how superior he was thus numerically in that first period can best be appreciated, I think, by a glance at the diagram on the next page.

[Illustration:  Sketch 14.]