Hungary, B2, is not only geographically an outlier, but politically is the weakest link in the chain of the Austro-Germanic alliance.  The area of Hungary is almost denuded of men, for most of these have been called up to defend Germany, A, and in particular to prevent the invasion of Germany’s territory in Silesia at S. The one defence Hungary has against being raided and persuaded to an already tempting peace is the barrier of the Carpathian mountains, CCC.  When or if the passes shall be in Russian possession and the Russian cavalry reappear upon the Hungarian side of the hills, the first great political embarrassment of the enemy will have begun—­I mean the first great political embarrassment to his strategy.

(a) Shall he try to defend those passes above all?  Then he must detach German corps, and detach them very far from the areas which are vital to the core of the alliance—­that is, to the German Empire, A.

(b) Shall he use only Hungarian troops to defend Hungary?  Then he emphasizes the peculiar moral isolation of Hungary, and leaves her inclined, if things go ill, to make a separate peace.

(c) Shall he abandon Hungary?  And let the Russians do what they will with the passes over the Carpathians and raid the Hungarian plain at large?  Then he loses a grave proportion of his next year’s wheat, much of his dwindling horse supply, his almost strangled sources of petrol.  He tempts Roumania to come in (for a great sweep of Eastern Hungary is nationally Roumanian); and he loses the control in men and financial resources of one-half of his Allies if the danger and the distress persuade Hungary to stand out.  For the Hungarians have no quarrel except from their desire to dominate the southern Slavs; to fight Austria’s battles means very little to them, and to fight Germany’s battles means nothing at all.

There is, of course, much more than this.  If Hungary dropped out, could Austria remain?  Would not the Government at Vienna, rather than lose the dual monarchy, follow Hungary’s lead?  In that case, the Germanic alliance would lose at one stroke eleven-twenty-fifths of its men.  It would lose more than half of its reserves of men, for the Austrian reserve is, paradoxically enough, larger than the German reserve, though not such good material.

Admire how in every way this geographical and political problem of Hungary confuses the strategical plan of the German General Staff!  They cannot here act upon pure strategics.  They cannot treat the area of operations like a chessboard, and consider the unique object of inflicting a military defeat upon the Russians.  Their inability to do so proceeds from the fact that this great awkward salient, Hungarian territory, is not politically subject to Berlin, is not in spiritual union with Berlin; may be denuded of men to save Berlin, and is the most exposed of all our enemy’s territory to attack.  Throughout the war it will be found that this problem perpetually presents itself to the Great General Staff of the Prussians:  “How can we save Hungary without weakening our Eastern line?  If we abandon Hungary, how are we to maintain our effectives?”