To this great series of actions, which history will probably know by the name of Lemberg, we will now turn.

When this large Russian movement against the right of von Auffenberg’s army, and the considerable Russian concentration there, was clearly discerned, the Austrian force was immediately augmented, and it was not until after the first stages of the conflict we are about to describe that it counted the full numbers mentioned above.  But, even so reinforced, it was inadequate for the very heavy task which there fell upon it.  It is not to be denied that its heterogeneous composition—­that is, its necessary weakness in quality—­affected its value; but the principal factor in its ill success was still the superiority of Russian numbers in this field, and this, in its turn, proceeded from a rapidity and completeness in the Russian mobilization for which the enemy had never made provision.

The action of the Russian left against von Auffenberg was twofold:  Russky, from the north, was coming across the river Bug, and struck an Austrian entrenched line in front of Lemberg.  His numbers permitted him to turn that entrenched line, or, at any rate, to threaten its turning, for Russky’s right stretched almost to within cavalry touch of Tomasow.  In combination with this movement, and strictly synchronizing with it, Brussilov was advancing from the Sereth River.  Both these movements were being carried out full during the last days of August.

[Illustration:  Sketch 70.]

It was on Friday, the 28th of that month, that Tarnopol fell, as we have seen, into the hands of the Russians, and that Brussilov was, therefore, able to effect his junction with Russky in the north, and this success was the occasion of the first of those bayonet actions on a large scale wherein the Russians throughout the war continued to show such considerable personal superiority over their opponents.

When Tarnopol had gone, not on account of the loss of their geographical point, but because its occupation rendered the junction of the Russian armies possible, and their advance in one great concave line upon Lemberg, it was no longer doubtful that von Auffenberg had lost this preliminary campaign.

There are moments in war where the historian can fix a turning-point, although the decision itself shall not yet have been reached.  Thus, in the campaign of 1793 between the French Revolution and its enemies, Turcoing was not a decisive action, but it was the necessary breeder of the decisive actions that followed.  And in the same way Tarnopol, though but a local success, decided Lemberg.  In the last days of August all von Auffenberg’s right had to fall back rather rapidly upon entrenched positions to the south and east of Lemberg itself, just as his left had had to fall back on similar positions against Russky.

The action for Lemberg itself opened, by a curious coincidence, the campaign which was the anniversary of the first fighting round Sedan, and closed precisely at the moment when the tide of German advance in the West was turned.