Or, again, treaties solemnly ratified between two Governments are generally regarded as binding.  And certainly a nation that never kept such a treaty for more than a week would find itself in a position where it was impossible to make any treaties at all.  Still, if upon a vague calculation of men’s memories, the acuteness of the circumstance, the advantage ultimately to follow, and so on, it be to the advantage of Prussia to break such solemn treaty, then such a treaty should be broken.

It will be apparent that what is called the “Frederician Tradition,” which is the soul of Prussia in her international relations, is not an unprincipled thing.  It has a principle, and that principle is a patriotic desire to strengthen Prussia, which particular appetite overweighs all general human morals and far outweighs all special Christian or European morals.

This doctrine of the “Frederician Tradition” does not mean that the Prussian statesmen wantonly do wrong, whether in acts of cruelty or in acts of treason and bad faith.  What it means is that, wherever they are met by the dilemma, “Shall I do this, which is to the advantage of my country but opposed to European and common morals, or that, which is consonant with those morals but to the disadvantage of my country?” they choose the former and not the latter course.

Prussia, endowed with this doctrine and possessed of a most excellent military organization and tradition, stood out as the first military power in Europe until the French Revolution.  The wars of the French Revolution and of Napoleon upset this prestige, and in the battle of Jena (1806) seemed to have destroyed it.  But it was too strong to be destroyed.  The Prussian Government was the first of Napoleon’s allies to betray Napoleon after the Russians had broken his power (1812).  They took part with the other Allies in finishing off Napoleon after the Russian campaign (1813-14); they were present with decisive effect upon the final field of Waterloo (1815), and remained for fifty years afterwards the great military power they had always been.  They had further added to their dominions such great areas in Northern Germany, beyond the original areas inhabited by the true Prussian stock, that they were something like half of the whole Northern German people when, in 1864, they entered into the last phase of their dominion.  They began by asking Austria to help them in taking from Denmark, a small and weak country, not only those provinces of hers which spoke German, but certain districts which were Danish as well.  France and England were inclined to interfere, but they did not yet understand the menace Prussia might be in the future, and they neglected to act.  Two years later Prussia suddenly turned upon Austria, her ally, defeated her in a very short campaign, and insisted upon Austria’s relinquishing for the future all claims over any part of the German-speaking peoples, save some ten millions in the valley of the