and partial developments, I find gaining ground in
the most different circles. The war was an adventure,
it was the German adventure under the Hohenzollern
tradition, to dominate the world. It was to be
the last of the Conquests. It has failed.
Without calling upon the reserve strength of America
the civilised world has defeated it, and the war continues
now partly upon the issue whether it shall be made
for ever impossible, and partly because Germany has
no organ but its Hohenzollern organisation through
which it can admit its failure and develop its latent
readiness for a new understanding on lines of mutual
toleration. For that purpose nothing more reluctant
could be devised than Hohenzollern imperialism.
But the attention of every new combatant—it
is not only Germany now—has been concentrated
upon military necessities; every nation is a clenched
nation, with its powers of action centred in its own
administration, bound by many strategic threats and
declarations, and dominated by the idea of getting
and securing advantages. It is inevitable that
a settlement made in a conference of belligerents
alone will be shortsighted, harsh, limited by merely
incidental necessities, and obsessed by the idea of
hostilities and rivalries continuing perennially;
it will be a trading of advantages for subsequent
attacks. It will be a settlement altogether different
in effect as well as in spirit from a world settlement
made primarily to establish a new phase in the history
of mankind.
Let me take three instances of the impossibility of
complete victory on either side giving a solution
satisfactory to the conscience and intelligence of
reasonable men.
The first—on which I will not expatiate,
for everyone knows of its peculiar difficulty—is
Poland.
The second is a little one, but one that has taken
hold of my imagination. In the settlement of
boundaries preceding this war the boundary between
Serbia and north-eastern Albania was drawn with an
extraordinary disregard of the elementary needs of
the Albanians of that region. It ran along the
foot of the mountains which form their summer pastures
and their refuge from attack, and it cut their mountains
off from their winter pastures and market towns.
Their whole economic life was cut to pieces and existence
rendered intolerable for them. Now an intelligent
Third Party settling Europe would certainly restore
these market towns, Ipek, Jakova, and Prisrend, to
Albania. But the Albanians have no standing in
this war; theirs is the happy lot that might have
fallen to Belgium had she not resisted; the war goes
to and fro through Albania; and when the settlement
comes, it is highly improbable that the slightest
notice will be taken of Albania’s plight in the
region. In which case these particular Albanians
will either be driven into exile to America or they
will be goaded to revolt, which will be followed no
doubt by the punitive procedure usual in the Balkan
peninsula.