Tirpitz says that his first impression, when he received this document in Tarasp, was that Serbia could not possibly accept the terms of such an ultimatum.  And he adds that he believed neither in the possibility of localizing the war nor in the neutrality of England.  In his view the greatest care was required to reassure the Russian Government, especially as England would wish “to let war break out in order to establish the balance of power on the Continent as she understood it.”  But the Chancellor expressed the wish that he should not return to Berlin, for his doing so might give rise to remarks.  If this be so, it seems to have been a very unfortunate step.  The Emperor and his most important Ministers should all have been in Berlin at such a time.  Bethmann’s advice appears intelligible only if he thought, as is quite possible, that he could himself handle the negotiations best if the Emperor and Tirpitz were both out of the way.  If so, he was not successful.  He did not in the end respond to Sir Edward Grey’s wish for a conference, and earlier he had failed to bridle the impulsive ally who was dashing wildly about.  It looks as tho, however good his intentions may have been, he was taking terrible risks.

Now this was the crucial period.  Grey was doing his very utmost to avert war, and was even pressing Serbia to accept the bulk of what was in the ultimatum.  As to his real intentions, I may, without presumption, claim to be better informed than Admiral von Tirpitz.  Sir Edward Grey and I had been intimate friends for over a quarter of a century before the period in which the Admiral, who, so far as I know, never saw him, diagnoses the state of his intentions.  During the eight years previous to July, 1914, we had been closely associated and were working as colleagues in the Cabinets of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman and Mr. Asquith.  And in that July, throughout the weeks in question, Sir Edward was staying with me in my house in London, and considering with me the telegrams and incidents, great or small.

It is a pure myth that he had, at the back of his mind, any such intentions as the Admiral imagines.  He was working with every fiber put in action for the keeping of the peace.  He was pressing for that in St. Petersburg, in Paris, in Berlin, in Vienna, and in Belgrade.  He was not in the least influenced either by jealousy of Germany’s growth or by fear of a naval engagement with her, as Tirpitz infers.  All he wanted was to fulfil what, for him, was the sacred trust that had been committed to him, the duty of throwing the whole weight of England’s influence on the side of peace.  And that was not less the view of Mr. Asquith, whom I knew equally intimately, and it was the view of all my colleagues in the Cabinet.