of German interests, and to keep watch on the method of its fulfilment.  The Chancellor, says his critic, did not hesitate to accept the decision of the Emperor, apparently imagining that Austria’s position as a Great Power was already shaken and would collapse unless she could insist on being compensated at the expense of the greedy Serbians.  He probably had in his mind the success obtained in the earlier Balkan crisis over Bosnia and Herzegovina.  He goes on to tell us that he was not informed as to what the Emperor was thinking of during his tour in northern waters, but that he had reason to believe that he did not anticipate serious danger to the peace of the world.  And he observes, as a characteristic of the Emperor, that when he was not apprehensive of danger he would express himself without restraint about the traditions of his illustrious predecessors, but the moment matters began to look critical his became a hesitating mood.  The Admiral thinks that if the Emperor had not left Berlin, and if the full Government machinery had been at work, means might have been found by the Emperor and the Ministry of averting the danger of war.  As, however, the Chief of the General Staff, the Head of the Admiralty Staff, and Tirpitz himself were kept away from Berlin during the following weeks, the matter was handled solely by the Chancellor, who, being in truth not sufficiently experienced in great European affairs, was not able to estimate the reliability of those who were advising him in the Foreign Office.

[Illustration:  COUNT LEOPOLD BERCHTOLD

MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF AUSTRIA-HUNGARY FROM FEB. 1912 TO JAN. 1915.]

Von Tirpitz goes on to say that by July 11 the Berlin Foreign Office had heard that the Entente had advised yielding at Belgrade.  The Chancellor, he declares, could now have brought about a peaceful solution, but, convinced as he was that the Entente did not mean war, he drew the shortsighted conclusion that Austria, without considering the Entente, might force a march into Serbia and yet not endanger the world’s peace.  His optimism was disastrous.  On July 13 he (the Chancellor) was, according to Tirpitz, informed of the essential points in the proposed Austrian ultimatum.  Bethmann, as already stated, says that he did not see the ultimatum itself until the 22nd, when it had already been dispatched.  But he does not say that he had been given no forecast of its contents from the German Ambassador at Vienna.  Tirpitz quotes, but without giving its exact date, a memorandum sent to him at Tarasp apparently just after the 13th.  It was forwarded from the Admiralty, and was in these terms:  “Our Ambassador in Vienna, Herr von Tschirsky, has ascertained privately, as well as from Count Berchtold, that the ultimatum to be sent by Austria to Serbia will contain the following demands:  I. A proclamation of King Peter to his people in which he will command them to abstain from greater Serbian agitation.  II.  Participation of a higher Austrian official in the investigation of the assassination.  III.  Dismissal and punishment of all officers and officials proved to be accomplices.”