It is interesting to compare Tirpitz’s account of the meeting that took place then, on the invitation of the Emperor, with that of Bethmann, altho the former was not present, and bases his judgment only on what was reported to him as Minister.  He gives an account of what happened which makes the meeting seem a more important one than the ex-Chancellor takes it to have been.  The Admiral’s view is that at this date what was urgently wanted was “prompt and frank” action.  Austria should not have been allowed to rush upon Serbia, however just her causes for anger.  On the other hand the German Emperor should have at once and directly appealed to the Czar to co-operate with him in endeavoring to secure such a response to reason and expression of contrition on the part of Serbia as would have eased off the situation, which was full of danger.  For, with an unfriendly Entente interesting itself, no war which broke out was likely to be capable of being kept localized.

Tirpitz was not in Berlin on July 5, but he received reports from there of what was happening.  Neither he nor von Moltke, the Chief of the General Staff, was consulted, but Tirpitz declares that the Emperor saw at Potsdam the Minister of War, von Falkenhayn, and also the Minister of the Military Cabinet, von Lyncker.  If so, whether or not the conference was technically a Crown Council, the meeting was a very important one.

Tirpitz confirms Bethmann in saying that, prompted by chivalrous feeling, the German Emperor responded to the Emperor of Austria by promising support and fidelity.  He declares that the Emperor William did not consider the intervention of Russia to protect Serbia as probable, because he thought that the Czar would never support regicides, and that, besides, Russia was not prepared for war, either in a military or financial sense.  Moreover, the Emperor somewhat optimistically presumed that France would hold Russia back on account of her own disadvantageous state of finance and her lack of heavy artillery.  The Emperor did not refer to England; complications with that country were not thought of.  The Emperor’s view thus was that a further extension of dangerous complications was unlikely.  His hope was that Serbia would give in, but he considered it desirable that Germany should be prepared in case of a different issue of the Austro-Serbian dispute.  It was for that reason that he had on the 5th commanded the Chancellor, Bethmann Hollweg; the Minister of War, von Falkenhayn; the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Zimmermann; and the Minister of the War Cabinet, von Lyncker, to Potsdam.  It was then decided that all steps should be avoided which would attract political attention or involve much expense.  After this decision the Emperor, on the advice of the Chancellor, started on his journey to the North Cape, for which arrangements had already been made.  The duty of the Chancellor under the circumstances was to consider any promise to be given to Austria from the standpoint