The next day the Emperor set off in his yacht for the northern seas.  The Chancellor says he advised him to do this because the expedition was one which the Emperor had been in the habit of making every year at that season, and it would cause talk if this usual journey were to be abandoned.

The other point relates to the date on which the German Chancellor saw the text of the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia.  He tells us that it was brought to him for the first time on the evening of July 22 by Herr von Jagow, the Foreign Secretary, who had just received it from the Austrian Ambassador.  The Chancellor says that von Jagow thought the ultimatum too strongly worded, and wished for some delay.  But when he told the Ambassador this the answer was that the document had already been dispatched, and it was published in the Vienna Telegraph the next morning.

The conclusion of the Chancellor is that the stories of the Crown Council at Potsdam on July 5, and of the co-operation of the German Government in preparing the ultimatum, are mere legends.  The question of substance as regards the first may be left for interpretation by posterity.  As to the controversy about the second, it would be interesting to know whether Herr von Tschirsky, the German Ambassador at Vienna, knew of the ultimatum before it assumed the form in which it reached Berlin on July 22.  I shall have more to say about these incidents later on when I come to Admiral von Tirpitz’s account of them.

My criticism of Herr von Bethmann Hollweg is in no case founded on any doubt at all as to his veracity.  I formed, in the course of my dealings with him, a high opinion of his integrity.  But in his reasoning he is apt to let circumstances escape his notice which are in a large degree material for forming a judgment.  This does not seem to me to arise from any deliberate intention to be otherwise than candid.  I am sure that he believes that he is telling the full truth at all times.  But he became a convinced partizan, quite intelligibly.  This fact, however creditable to his patriotism, seems to me not only to explain why he thought it right to continue in office and stand by his country as long as he could through the war, but also to detract somewhat from the weight that would otherwise attach to the opinions of an honorable and well-meaning man.

I pass to the examination of the concurrent policy against which he could not prevail, and the existence of which takes the edge off his reasoning.  That policy is expounded fully and clearly by Admiral von Tirpitz, a German of the traditional Military School, a man of great ability, and one who rarely if ever allowed himself to be deflected from pursuing a concentrated purpose to the utmost of his power.

Of the general character of this purpose his colleague, Bethmann Hollweg, was conscious, as appears from passages in the book just discussed, of which I have selected one for translation.