As to the rest of the narrative in the ex-Chancellor’s book, this is not the place to deal with it.  His view that Germany was doing her best to moderate the rash action in Vienna which resulted in the declaration of war on Serbia, while England was doing much less to restrain the course of events at St. Petersburg, is not one which it is easy to bring into harmony with the documents published.  This is a part of the history of events before the war which has already been exhaustively dealt with by others, and it is no part of the purpose of these pages to write of matters about which I have no first-hand knowledge.  For I had little opportunity of taking any direct part in our affairs with Germany after my final visit to that country, which was in 1912.  My duties as Lord Chancellor were too engrossing.

There are, however, in this connection just two topics toward the end of the book which are of such interest that I will refer to them before passing away from it.  The first is the story that there was a Crown Council at Potsdam on July 5, 1914, at which the Emperor determined on war.  This Herr von Bethmann Hollweg denies.  He explains that in the morning of that day the Austrian Ambassador lunched with the Emperor, presumably at Potsdam, and took the opportunity of handing to him a letter written by the Emperor of Austria personally, together with a memorandum on policy drawn up in Vienna.  This memorandum contained a detailed plan for opposing Russian enterprise in the Balkan peninsula by energetic diplomatic pressure.  Against a hostile Serbia and an unreliable Roumania resort was to be had to Bulgaria and Turkey, with a view to the establishment of a Balkan League, excluding Serbia, to be formed under the aegis of the Central Powers.  The Serajevo murder was declared to have demonstrated the aggressive and irreconcilable character of Serbian policy.  The Austrian Emperor’s letter endorsed the views contained in the memorandum, and added that, if the agitation in Belgrade continued, the pacific views of the Powers were in danger.  The German Emperor said that he must consult his Chancellor before answering, and sent for Bethmann Hollweg and the Under-Secretary, Zimmermann.  He saw them in the afternoon in the park of the Neues Palais at Potsdam.  The Chancellor thinks that no one else was present.  It was agreed that the situation was very serious.  The ex-Chancellor says that he had already learned the tenor of these Austrian documents, altho he did not see the text of the subsequent ultimatum to Serbia until July 22.  It was determined that it was no part of the duty of Germany to give advice to her Ally as to how she should deal with the Serajevo murder.  But every effort was to be made to prevent the controversy between Austria and Serbia from developing into an international conflict.  It was useful to try to bring in Bulgaria, but Roumania had better be left out of account.  These conclusions were in accordance with the Chancellor’s own opinion, and when he returned to Berlin he communicated them to the Austrian Ambassador.  Germany would do what she could to make Roumania friendly, and Austria was told that in any case she might rely on her Ally, Germany, to stand firmly by her side.