On the details of the diplomatic aspect of our endeavor, and on the spirit in which it was sought to carry it out, the second and third chapters of the book may serve to throw some light.  The fourth chapter relates to the strategical plan, worked out after much consideration, for the possible event of failure.  The plan was throughout based on the maintenance of superior sea power as the paramount instrument.  As is indicated, the conservation of sufficient sea power implied as essential close and friendly relations with France, and also with Russia.  Had there been no initial reason for the Entente policy, to be found in the desire to get rid of all causes of friction with these two great nations, the preservation of the prospect of continuing able to command the sea in war would in itself have necessitated the Entente.  This conclusion was the result of the stocktaking of their assets for self-defense which the Entente Powers had to make when confronted with the growing organization for war of the Central Powers.

To set up the balancing of Powers as a principle was what we in this country would have been glad to have avoided had it been practicable to do so.  We should have preferred the freedom of our old position of “splendid isolation.”  But the growing preparations of the Central Powers compelled Great Britain, France, and Russia to think of safety for each of them severally as to be secured only by treating such safety as a common interest.  In the face of a new and growing danger we dared not leave ourselves to the risk of being dealt with in detail.  The first thing to be done was, if possible, to convince the Central Powers that it would be to their own advantage to come to a complete agreement with us, an agreement of a business character, analogous to that which Lord Lansdowne had so satisfactorily concluded with France, and accompanied by cessation of the reasons which had led them to pile up armaments.  There were highly influential persons in Germany who were far from averse to the suggested business arrangement.  The armament question presented greater difficulty in that country, largely because of its tradition.  But its solution was vital, for there were also those in Germany whose aim was to dispute with Great Britain the possession of the trident.  Now for us, who constituted the island center of a scattered Empire, and who depended for food and raw materials on freedom to sail our ships, the question of sea power adequate for security was one of life or death.  We could not sit still and allow Germany so to increase her navy in comparison with ours that she could make other Powers believe that their safest course was to throw in their lot and join their fleets with hers.  We were bound to seek to make and maintain friendships, and to this end not only to preserve our margin of strength at sea, but to make ourselves able, if it became essential, to help our friends in case of aggression, thereby securing ourselves.  That was the new situation which in the final result the old military spirit in Germany had created.