Such is Herr von Bethmann Hollweg’s explanation.  He is, I have no doubt, sincerely convinced of its truth, and he explains the grounds of his conviction in detail and with much ability.  But there is a fallacy in his reasoning which becomes transparent when one reads along with his book that of his colleague.  If we put out of sight the deep feeling awakened here by the brutality of the invasion of Belgium, to which violation of Treaty obligations the former declares that Germany was compelled by military considerations that were unanswerable, and look at the history of Anglo-German relations before the war, the inference is irresistible that it was not the object of developing in a peaceful atmosphere German commerce and industry that England objected to.  Such a development might have been formidable for us.  It would have compelled great efforts on our part to improve the education of our people and our organization for peaceful enterprises.  But it would have been legitimate.  The objection of this country was directed against quite other things that were being done by Germany in order to attain her purpose.  The essence of these was the attempt to get her way by creating armaments which should in effect place her neighbors at her mercy.  We who live on islands, and are dependent for our food and our raw materials on our being able to protect their transport and with it ourselves from invasion, could not permit the sea-protection which had been recognized from generation to generation as a necessity for our preservation to be threatened by the creation of naval forces intended to make it precarious.  As the navies of Europe were growing, not only those of France and Russia, but the navy of Italy also, we had to look, in the interests of our security, to friendly relations with these countries.  We aimed at establishing such friendly relations, and our method was to get rid of all causes of friction, in Newfoundland, in Egypt, in the East, and in the Mediterranean.  That was the policy which was implied in our Ententes.  We were not willing to enter into military alliances and we did not do so.  Our policy was purely a business policy, and everything else was consequential on this, including the growing sense of common interests and of the desire for the maintenance of peace.  I do not think that Admiral Tirpitz wanted actual war.  But he did want power to enforce submission to the expansion of Germany at her will.  And this power was his means to the end which was what less Prussianized minds in Germany contemplated as attainable in less objectionable ways.  Such a means he could not fashion in the form of strength in sea power which would have placed us at his mercy, without arousing our instinct for self-preservation.