In fine, Germany had not adequately thought out or prepared for the perils which she undertook when she assumed the risks of the war of 1914.  No doubt she knew more about the shortcomings of the Russian army than did the French or the British.  On these, pretty exact knowledge of the Russian shortages enabled her to reckon.  There we miscalculated more than she did.  But she was not strong enough to make sure work of a brief but conclusive campaign in the West, which was all she could afford while Russia was organizing.  Then, later on, she ought to have seen that, if the submarine campaign which she undertook should bring the United States into the war, her ultimate fate would be sealed by blockade.  In the end she no doubt fought magnificently.  But she made these mistakes, which were mainly due to that swelled-headedness which deflected her reasoning and prevented her from calculating consequences aright.

There was a good deal of this apparent even in 1912.  It had led to the Agadir business in the previous summer, and the absence of wise prevision was still apparent.  I believed that this phase of militarism would pass when Imperial Germany became a more mature nation.  Indeed, it was passing under the growing influence of Social Democracy, which was greatly increased by the elections which took place while I was in Berlin in 1912.[3] But still there was the possibility of an explosion; and when I returned to London, altho I was full of hope that relations between the two countries were going to be improved, and told my colleagues so, I also reported that there were three matters about which I was uneasy.

The first was my strong impression that the new Fleet Law would be insisted on.

The second was the possibility that Tirpitz might be made Chancellor of the Empire in place of Bethmann Hollweg.  This was being talked of as possible when I was in Berlin.

The third was the want of continuity in the supreme direction of German policy.  Foreign policy especially was under divided control.  Von Tschirsky observed to me in 1906 that what he had been saying about a question we were discussing represented his view as Foreign Minister of Prussia, but that next door was the Chancellor, who might express quite a different view to me if I asked him; and that if, later on, I went to the end of the Wilhelmstrasse and turned down Unter den Linden I would come to the Schloss, where I might derive from the Emperor’s lips an impression quite different from that given by either himself or the Chancellor.  This made me feel that, desirous as Bethmann Hollweg had shown himself to establish and preserve good relations, we could not count on his influence being maintained or prevailing.  As an eminent foreign diplomatist observed, “In this highly organized nation, when you have ascended to the very top story you find not only confusion but chaos.”