The Emperor therefore sent his message in the beginning of 1912, to the effect that feeling had become so much excited that it was not enough to rely on the ordinary diplomatic intercourse for softening it, and that he was anxious for an exchange of views between the Cabinets of Berlin and London, of a personal and direct kind.  As the result of this intimation, the British Cabinet decided to send one of its members to Berlin to hold “conversations,” with a view to exploring and, if practicable, softening the causes of tension, and I was requested by the Prime Minister and Sir Edward Grey and my other colleagues to go to Berlin and undertake the task.  Our Ambassador there came over to London specially to discuss arrangements, and he returned to Berlin to make them before I started.

I arrived in the German capital on February 8, 1912, and spent some days in interviews with the Emperor, the Imperial Chancellor, the Naval Minister (Admiral von Tirpitz), and others of the Emperor’s Ministry.  The narrative of my conversations I have extracted from the records I made after each interview, for the preservation so far as possible of the actual expressions used during it.

My first interview was one with Herr von Bethmann Hollweg, the Imperial Chancellor.  We met in the British Embassy, and the conversation, which was quite informal, was a full and agreeable one.  My impression, and I still retain it, was that Bethmann Hollweg was then as sincerely desirous of avoiding war as I was myself.  I told him of certain dangers quite frankly, and he listened and replied with what seemed to me to be a full understanding of our position.  I said that the increasing action of Germany in piling up magnificent armaments was, of course, within the unfettered rights of the German people.  But the policy had an inevitable consequence in the drawing together of other nations in the interests of their own security.  This was what was happening.  I told him frankly that we had made naval and military preparations, but only such as defense required, and as would be considered in Germany matter of routine.  I went on to observe that our faces were set against aggression by any nation, and I told him, what seemed to relieve his mind, that we had no secret military treaties.  But, I added, if France were attacked and an attempt made to occupy her territory, our neutrality must not be reckoned on by Germany.  For one thing, it was obvious that our position as an island protected by the sea would be affected seriously if Germany had possession of the Channel ports on the northern shores of France.  Again, we were under treaty obligation to come to the aid of Belgium in case of invasion, just as we were bound to defend Portugal and Japan in certain eventualities.  In the third place, owing to our dependence on freedom of sea-communications for food and raw materials, we could not sit still if Germany elected to develop her fleet to such an extent as to imperil our naval protection.  She might build more ships, but we should in that case lay down two keels for each one she laid down.